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NGOs’ Strategies and the Challenge of Development and Democracy
in Bangladesh
Naila Kabeer, Simeen Mahmud and Jairo Guillermo Isaza Castro
Summary
Recent research Bangladesh has come to embody an interesting paradox. On the
one hand, it has experienced rising rates of growth, a slow but steady decline in
poverty and impressive progress in terms of social development, outperforming
some of its richer neighbours on a number of Millennium Development Goals. On
the other hand, it has an abysmal record on governance and was ranked as the
world’s most corrupt country for five consecutive years by Transparency
International. There is an emerging view that the country’s extremely active devel-
opment NGO sector has contributed to some of the more positive achievements.
The question that this paper sets out to address is why these organisations have
not made an equivalent contribution on the governance front. The paper argues
that while Bangladesh is reported to have more NGOs per capita than other
developing countries, those organisations have gradually abandoned social mobil-
ising and collective action strategies for a narrower focus on service delivery and
microcredit provision. Our research with the members of six organisations that
straddle the continuum between microfinance and social mobilisation suggests
that the specific developmental strategies of these membership-based groups do
indeed have consequences for both development and democracy in the country. 
Keywords: Bangladesh; civil society; NGOs; citizenship; social movements; 
associations; microcredit service delivery.
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1 Introduction: aims of  the paper
Bangladesh has made considerable progress on the development front. Along
with rising rates of growth and a slow but steady decline in poverty, it has made
remarkable progress on the social front in terms of health and education. It is on
track to achieve key MDGs more rapidly than some of its more prosperous 
neighbours (Rahman 2006). However, it has performed abysmally on the 
governance front. Indeed it was classified as the world’s most corrupt country for
five consecutive years (1997 to 2001) by Transparency International
(Transparency International-Bangladesh 1999). The country’s large and active
development NGO sector is credited by many with the more positive development
aspects of this Bangladesh paradox (World Bank 2003 and 2006). The question
we will attempt to address in this paper is why the sector has failed to make
equivalent progress on the governance front.
Bangladesh is reported to have more NGOs per capita than any other developing
country (DFID 2005: 1), with around 22,000 NGOs estimated to be in existence.
This paper is concerned with a particular subset of these organisations – those
that are registered with the government and engaged in development activities.
These development NGOs are largely indigenous in origin but the majority of
them are reliant on external funds. Together they constitute a very visible and 
significant strand of civil society in Bangladesh, one that is far more active in the
everyday lives of its poorer citizens than other formal associations in society or,
for that matter, than the government. Current estimates suggest that they operate
in more than 78 per cent of villages in what is still a largely rural society and that
they directly reach around 35 per cent of the total population (Devine 2003). 
Development NGOs can be seen to constitute a ‘sector’ in the Bangladesh 
context in the sense that, to a greater or lesser extent, they share certain values
and goals in common: commitment to religious tolerance, or at least unwillingness
to be seen as intolerant; concern with poverty reduction but through somewhat 
differing routes; promotion of gender equality, although sometimes in a very
tokenistic sense; and the promotion of group-based strategies, although not 
necessarily for the same purpose. At the same time, as these caveats suggest,
NGOs do not constitute a homogenous sector. Indeed, there are important 
differences in their analysis of poverty and the theories of change which animate
their strategies. However, there has been considerable convergence over time.
The vast majority today are concerned with the provision of microfinance services,
sometimes on their own, sometimes in combination with social services and
awareness training. Organisations focusing on the social mobilisation of the poor,
once a strong presence within the NGO sector, have declined rapidly over time. 
This paper is based on a research project on civil society and democratic 
participation in Bangladesh which was undertaken under the aegis of the
Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability led
by the Institute of Development Studies and funded by DFID. The paper can be
seen as the latest in a series of publications dealing with the role of development
NGOs. The first of these outlined some of the challenges of constructing equality
of citizenship in development country contexts (Kabeer 2002). It pointed to the
importance of substantive as well as formal equality of rights as the basis of 
democratic citizenship, the role of the state in blocking equality of citizenship and
suggested the need for grassroots collective action by marginalised groups as a
key route to building citizenship identity and practices from the bottom up.
A subsequent research project explored what citizenship and rights meant to
associations of the working poor in urban and rural Bangladesh (Kabeer 2003;
Kabeer with Huq Kabir 2009). While the findings of this research confirmed the
importance of collective action, they also suggested that not all forms of 
association contributed to democratically relevant forms of collective action. They
revealed that the socially oriented development NGOs (Samata, Nijera Kori and
BRAC) that were studied in rural areas were far more likely to promote such
action than the trade unions and minimalist microfinance organisations that made
up the urban sample. However, it was possible that the very different conditions
prevailing in rural and urban contexts may have contributed to this unevenness of
impact. As a result, further research was undertaken into the democratic potential
of different kinds of development NGOs (including some of those that appeared in
the earlier study) in the rural context alone. The findings of the project are the
basis of this paper. Other publications from the Development Research Centre
that are relevant to the particular concerns of this paper are Kabeer, Huq Kabir
and Huq (2009), Mahmud (2007) and Kabeer and Huq (2010). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 of the paper discusses the 
theoretical rationale for conducting such a study and adds a concern with 
development impacts to our concerns with substantive democracy. Section 3 
provides an account of state-society relations in Bangladesh and the parlous state
of its democratic processes. It also tracks the history of the NGO sector, its 
emergence in the aftermath of the War of Liberation in 1971 and its evolution to
the present time. It also tracks the trajectories followed by the development NGOs
that are the subject of this study. Section 4 describes the methodology used in the
study and main membership characteristics of the NGOs selected for the study.
Section 5 provides a preliminary account of the impacts of the NGOs, using
descriptive statistics, while Section 6 uses multivariate analysis to control for
selection bias and differences in relevant characteristics of individual respondents,
their households and their location. Section 7 discusses the findings, drawing on
the larger literature to help with their interpretation. Section 8 draws out some
general conclusions about the role of civil society in the promotion of democracy
and development.
2 Civil society, democracy and 
development: theoretical 
perspectives
Ideas about civil society have become an increasingly important strand in current
discussions about democracy and development within the international donor
community. Many of these ideas are rooted in Western political philosophy and
have been imported, not always successfully, into the development discourse.
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
8
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
9
There are, of course, competing conceptualisations of civil society within this
broader literature, with competing implications for state–society relations, and it is
worth considering which conceptualisations have been favoured over others within
the donor community. Our discussion makes a broad distinction between 
mainstream and alternative traditions in current thinking about civil society (Howell
and Pearce 2001).
Mainstream perspectives are largely rooted in liberal theories and view civil society as
the realm of voluntary associations that exists in the space between state, market
and the domain of kinship and family. There is a strong normative tendency within
this tradition – the belief that civil society is generally a ‘good thing’ in a society’s
‘transition to modernity’ (Lewis 2004). Ferguson viewed civil society as an arena
of moral responsibility – a socially desirable alternative to the state of nature on
the one hand, and the growing individualism of emergent capitalism on the other.
de Tocqueville stressed the principles of voluntarism, community spirit and 
independent associational life as a counterbalance to state domination of society. 
More recently, the work of Putnam promotes the idea of civil society as the ‘social
capital’ of a nation, generating norms, trust and networks that can be harnessed
for collective action in the interests of the wider society. He contrasts this to the
vertical patron–client relationships which characterise kin-based communities and
which promote a bounded form of morality (Banfield’s ‘amoral familism’) – the
privileging of narrow self-interest over the collective good. However, he does not
distinguish between democratic and anti-democratic norms and values that may
circulate within different networks and associations (Howell and Pearce 2001).
While he recognises that some associations are more productive of democratic
values than others, this is a minor caveat to his major theme of celebrating the
positive contribution of civil society to democracy because of the social capital
they produced (Elliot 2006: 1–39). According to him, such contributions could
arise equally from birdwatching societies and bowling clubs as from those that
actively set out to promote democratic values. 
Putnam successfully argued for the relevance of his work to developing countries:
not only did the density of local associational life contribute to political stability and
good governance but it was as essential to growth as investment, technology and
competitive market forces (Putnam 1993a and 1993b). It is his ideas that underpin
a great deal of the positive discourse about civil society that characterise 
international development (Diamond 1994). The rise of neoliberal values within
the donor community in the 1980s and the desire to cut back on the role of the
state in both the economy and service delivery have seen growing efforts to
strengthen civil society in developing country contexts. Civil society organisations
have become an integral part of the ‘privatisation’ agenda, representing an 
alternative form of service provision in contexts where markets have either failed
or simply failed to emerge. Civil society organisations have also become an 
integral part of the ‘good governance’ agenda, based on the assumption of ‘an
elective affinity’ between civil society and democracy (Béteille 2000). Within the
(frequently justified) neoliberal critique of bloated, inefficient and corrupt states,
‘the expectation is that promoting civil society organisations will support not only
economic advancement but also the more complex tasks of ensuring democratic
political change and social justice in developing countries’ (Fowler 1995).
There is, however, an alternative tradition within the civil society literature,
strongly influenced by the radical thinking of Marx, Gramsci and others, which
depicts civil society as a sphere of conflict in the struggle for ideological 
hegemony, separate from, but enmeshed with the power structures of state and
market (Davis and McGregor 2000; Howell and Pearce 2001). While Marx has
been criticised for casting these struggles in purely class terms, his work 
nevertheless draws attention to the inequality of the terms on which these 
struggles take place. The work of Gramsci offers a more complex account of civil
society associations, one that does not view them as inherently democratic. He
pointed out that the resilience of the capitalist ruling class lay in its capacity to
control through consent as much as coercion. While the state might use coercive
tactics to defend the ruling order, civil society was the realm where consent of
the ruled was constructed – and contested – through the struggle for ideological
hegemony. Civil society is thus an arena where a diversity of associations, 
characterised by varying degrees of co-optation into existing power structures,
engaged in activities which, to differing degrees, challenge or uphold the existing
social order. This is civil society as empirical reality rather than normative 
concept. 
Despite differences in the way that civil society has been conceptualised within
mainstream and radical traditions, Béteille points out that both approaches contain
ways of thinking that draw attention to the importance of everyday life in 
determining the quality of state–society relations. This is evident in Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemonic culture whereby the values and interests of the ruling class
pass into the ‘common sense’ of society, becoming the values and interests of all.
Society is thus not simply a matter of legal rights guaranteed by the state or of
economic interests driven by the market: 
It is also a matter of ideas, beliefs, values, customs and habits that act on the
state and market and are in turn acted upon by them in complex ways and at
different levels. State and market contribute something, but not everything
towards the cohesion and the dynamics of societies. 
(Béteille 2000: 176) 
In other words, the life of a nation depended as much on the ‘multitude of ordinary,
unnoticed and even obscure social habits and practices’ (Béteille 2000: 178) as it
did on the ‘grand institutions’ of state and church. 
For de Tocqueville as well, democracy was more than a political system. It was,
above all, a social system whose success depended on ‘good customs’ as well as
‘good laws’. de Tocqueville used the concept of ‘custom’ to encompass what he
called the ‘habits of the heart’: these referred to the mores and manners of daily
life as well as to the notions, opinions and ideas which make up the character of
people’s minds (1956: 299). Democracy did not need a harmonious civil society to
take root but it did require a basic ‘civility of manners’ in the conduct of everyday
life: the possibility of dialogue across divergent, if not opposed, ideas and 
interests and a ‘certain inner acceptance of equality’ (Béteille 2000: 179) as the
basis of social interchange. Enacting the right laws would amount to very little if
‘habits of the heart’ that had evolved in the context of feudal or caste-ridden 
societies remained unchanged. 
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This sociologically grounded understanding of democratic practice has particular
resonance for the South Asian societies which form the context of much of
Béteille’s work. While their constitutions generally guarantee the formal rights of
citizenship, their limited success with industrialisation, the uneven spread of 
market relations, the continued gulf between urban and rural life, the incapacity or
unwillingness of the state to provide basic security of life and livelihoods to its 
citizens and the proneness of the state to capture by powerful elites have meant
that democracy has very shallow roots in many of these societies. Identity, 
affiliations and access to resources are defined by one’s place within a social
order that is largely constituted by the ‘given’ relationships of family, kinship, caste
and so on – ‘the communities of birth’. These relationships pervade all spheres of
society and render irrelevant the liberal idea of an impersonal public sphere which
individuals enter as bearers of rights, equal in the eyes of the law. 
South Asian societies thus continue to operate as societies of castes and 
communities rather than societies of citizens. The equality of personhood, which is
at the heart of both liberal and radical ideas about citizenship, cannot be taken as
a precondition for democracy in these contexts. Rather, it comes into existence as
a part and parcel of the struggle for democracy. This gives the struggle for
democracy a dual character in these contexts. It is a struggle to construct the 
possibility of ‘chosen’ social relationships which are based on ‘communities of
practice’ alongside the given relationships that govern ‘communities of birth’. It is
also simultaneously a struggle to construct these communities as communities of
democratic practices and the ‘habits of the heart – the ‘inner acceptance of equality’
and its outward manifestation in the actions and behaviour of its members. 
As we noted in the introduction, development NGOs in the Bangladesh context work
largely through group-based strategies. To that extent, they are in the process of
constructing communities of practice, based on the kind of chosen relationships that
we are talking about. The aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which these
group-based strategies contribute to the goals of development and democracy.
We have spelt out the theoretical rationale for focusing on the contribution of civil
society to these goals. There is also an additional empirical rationale which was
spelt out in the introduction. This is to explore why development NGOs, largely
credited with the country’s achievements on the development front, failed so
abysmally in addressing the country’s notoriously bad governance. An appreciation
of the role of the NGO sector in Bangladesh requires an understanding of the 
history of state–society relations in Bangladesh. It also requires particular attention
to the influence that external donors have exercised in national policies and in the
shape that civil society has taken since the country’s independence. The next 
section of the paper provides a brief account of this history, focusing in greater
detail on the trajectories taken by the organisations that are the focus of this study. 
3 The rise and rise of  the NGO sector
Bangladesh came into existence after a devastating war of liberation from Pakistan
in 1971. Its experience as a semi-colony of Pakistan, the failure of a shared 
religious identity to keep the country together and the long years of military rule
led the newly constituted nation to adopt secularism, nationalism, democracy and
socialism as its fundamental constitutional principles. However, the challenge of
reconstructing the shattered economy in the face of hostility from powerful donors
to the country’s ‘socialist’ aspirations put increasing pressure on its first elected
government which sought to quell opposition through banning other political 
parties and instituting one-party rule. It was overthrown by army officers in 1976.
Foreign assistance began to flow more readily as the military regime sought to
combine economic liberalisation policies with appeals to the country’s Islamic
identity. Multi-party democracy was restored in 1990 by a popular movement but
the quality of governance did not improve; the Transparency International findings
relate to this period. The two main political parties treated elections as part of a
continuous ‘zero sum’ struggle to capture state power and the opportunities for
patronage and rent-seeking that went with it. The history of Bangladesh has 
therefore made it very clear that it is not simply the presence or absence of multi-
party elections that explains the quality of governance but the extent to which the
habits of democracy have taken root in the different spheres of life. 
Attempts to explain the problems of governance in Bangladesh abound. Wood
(2000) suggests that they can be traced to its ‘deep structures’ – forms of inequality
that are ‘deep-rooted in the psychology of Bengali society’. These translate into
‘natural deference-authority dyads’ (Wood 2000: 228), effectively ‘imprisoning’ its
social actors within highly personalised interlocking patron–client relationships from
which there are few avenues of escape. Survival within the system dictates that
social actors have little choice but to follow the dysfunctional forms of behaviour
generated by these systemic institutional forces. It is difficult for inmates to reform
such total institutions from within. Those who seek to escape must therefore look
for assistance to those outside the system; ‘donor and other external well-wishers
have a duty to provide that assistance’ (Wood 2000: 237).
The ‘prison inmates’ do not necessarily subscribe to Wood’s interpretation of their
situation. Nor do they accept the somewhat benign role assigned to external
donors. Sobhan (2000), for instance, suggests that donors are as culpable for the
current state of affairs as those vested interests within Bangladesh society who
have a stake in the status quo. Donors did not display any problem with the 
succession of military governments that ruled first Pakistan and then Bangladesh,
turning a blind eye to the violation of human and democratic rights. Nor does
Sobhan regard problems of bad governance in Bangladesh to be inherent in the
country’s institutions. He sees it rather as the hardening of an ‘essentially regulatory
problem at the beginning of the 1980s’ into systemic or socio-structural problems
because it was left unattended. And while he notes that social stratification – and
economic inequality – has grown in recent years, it is not institutionalised in the
deep structures of the country in the way that feudal relationships (and caste
inequalities) are embedded in the social structures elsewhere on the subcontinent: 
Bangladesh society remains more fluid with considerable scope for upward
mobility. Few if any people in Bangladesh can claim power through an 
inherited social legitimacy... Bangladesh’s prevailing social hierarchies remain
exposed to challenge from below as well as from competing aspirants
because the legitimacy of these differences is not widely accepted. 
(Sobhan 2000: 82)
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One obvious source of the challenge ‘from below’ in the context of Bangladesh is
its development NGOs, particularly in the light of their shared concern with poverty
reduction. Many of the better known NGOs in the country were founded in the
early years of independence by individuals and groups who had been active in the
struggle for independence and were motivated by the ideals that underpinned the
country’s constitution.1 Structural analysis of socioeconomic inequality, exemplified
in a number of classic texts from the 1970s and early 1980s gave a strong radical
edge to the work of the NGOs during this period (BRAC 1983; Arens and van
Beurden 1977; Village Study Group Working Papers 1975–1977). Many had been
influenced by the works of Paolo Freire, Ivan Illich and Franz Fanon and sought to
combine ‘conscientisation’ with organising and mobilising the poor. Most of these
organisations relied on funds from international NGOs and foundations that shared
their vision of social justice: OXFAM, Ford Foundation, Canadian University
Services Overseas, War on Want, Swallows, Action Aid, Diakonia. A number of
the more progressive Nordic donors were also willing to fund NGOs. The diversity
of funding sources, particularly the availability of funding from like-minded NGO
partners, promoted a diversity of organisations and organisational approaches
within the Bangladesh NGO community.
The NGO sector began to undergo a number of changes in the 1980s (Stiles
2002). The onset of military rule had narrowed the civil society space for radical
politics. At the same time, the rise of the neoliberal agenda prompted an increase
in official donor funding for NGOs as an acceptable ‘private’ alternative to the
state in the provision of social services. The government came under pressure to
accept, and even collaborate with, NGOs in the delivery of services such as
healthcare, education, sanitation and credit. The percentage of total foreign aid
disbursed to Bangladesh that went directly to NGOs rose from 6 per cent in 1990
to 18 per cent by 1995 and remained around this level in subsequent years
(Devine 2003). The availability of large-scale foreign funding led to a rapid and
opportunistic proliferation of organisations. Between 1990–91 and 1999–2000, the
number of national NGOs registered with the NGO Bureau had increased from
395 to 1223 while the number of international NGOs had grown from 99 to 147
(Devine 2003). However, the decline in the availability of funds from international
NGOs, who had operated on a partnership basis with national NGOs, and the
increasing reliance of the latter on official donor agencies altered the equation
between NGOs and their donors as well as within the NGO sector. 
Donor funding became increasingly concentrated in an ‘elite group of NGOs’
which moved into a league of their own in terms of size, budgets and staffing
(Devine 2003). Of the 1250 NGOs that received international assistance in
1999–2000, 11 of the bigger NGOs received 85 per cent of all assistance to
NGOs. In fact, the three largest NGOs – BRAC, ASA and Proshika (part of our
sample) – received more than 72 per cent of all donor funds to the NGO sector.
As Devine (2003) points out, the pattern of favouring the large NGOs reflected
pressures on donors ‘to scale up successful development operations, reduce 
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1 Accounts of these early years of the development NGO sector are to be found in Rutherford (2010) 
and Smillie (2009).
burdensome transaction costs, decrease NGO reliance on donor money and 
initiate a process that would secure financial sustainability’. Funding decisions were
based on technical criteria such as efficiency, value added, cost effectiveness and
output/performance orientations and sought to impose a ‘logical framework’ 
structure on how NGOs planned their activities. Donor concern with financial 
sustainability in turn led to marked greater concentration on microfinance services
within the NGO community, accompanied by the downgrading of social service
provision and the abandonment of social mobilisation. Some of these changes in
NGO orientation are tracked by Devine who notes that between 1989 and 1999,
the percentage of the combined expenditure of the 11 largest NGOs rose from 29
to 38 for microfinance and from 27 per cent to 34 per cent for economic support
services. It declined from 33 per cent to 22 per cent for social services and from
11 per cent to 6 per cent for social mobilisation. 
We can see therefore that there has been a considerable homogenisation of the
NGO sector in Bangladesh, particularly since the 1990s, driven by the ideological
predilections and technical requirements of official donor lending. The government
has also contributed to the homogenisation of the microfinance sector through the
establishment with the support of the World Bank of the PKSF – a large fund
intended to promote microfinance organisations that conform to the now 
internationally renowned Grameen Bank model. 
However, differences do remain within the NGO sector. As Thornton et al. pointed
out (Thornton, Devine, Houtzager, Wright and Rozario 2000), NGOs can be
placed along a continuum on the basis of their visions and strategies. At one end
of the continuum are the market-oriented organisations specialising in the delivery
of financial services – the minimalist microfinance organisations, while at the other
end are the social movement-oriented ones that focus primarily on social 
mobilisation. Occupying an intermediate position are NGOs which combine 
microfinance with social services, awareness raising or legal training. 
What we will be investigating in this study is the contributions of NGOs to the
goals of development and democracy in Bangladesh and the extent to which 
differences in their strategies make a difference to the impacts they have
achieved. Six NGOs were selected for our study exemplifying different points on
this continuum: ASA and Grameen Bank were selected to represent the minimalist
microfinance end of the continuum, BRAC and Proshika the intermediate position,
while Samata and Nijera Kori (NK) represented the ‘pure’ social mobilisation end.
It is worth noting that, with the exception of Grameen Bank, all of the organisations
had begun out at the radical end of the NGO continuum. All but NK and Samata
had moved closer over time to the market-oriented end. 
The differences and similarities in the organisational strategies of the six NGOs
are summarised in Table 4.1. In terms of similarities, they all adopt a group-based
approach with weekly group meetings and they all encourage their members to
save. The four organisations that have a strong focus on microcredit tend to work
largely with women, although around 30 per cent of Proshika’s membership
remains male. The two primarily social mobilisation organisations work with both
women and men. There is also a major difference in terms of sheer scale of 
operations: the microfinance organisations deal in millions of members, the social
mobilisation organisations in hundreds of thousands. The three larger organisations,
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BRAC, Grameen Bank and increasingly ASA, now operate at the global level, with
operations in various developing countries in Africa and Asia. We flesh out some
of the similarities and differences between these organisations in greater detail,
drawing on interviews with the staff of these different organisations as well as
information provided on their website and in the secondary literature. 
We start with ASA (Association for Social Advancement) whose transition from
social movement to minimalist microfinance organisation has been the most 
dramatic within the NGO sector.2 ASA was founded in 1978 by a group of social
activists whose vision, according to their first Annual Report, was to ‘create a
development organisation whose decision-makers are the downtrodden people
themselves’. It believed that the root of poverty was social injustice and that
poverty could not be eradicated until there was a ‘basic change in the social 
structure’ (Rutherford 2010: 70). Groups of the rural landless were organised to
create a people’s movement based on awareness and solidarity: ‘people will
determine and regulate their own destiny [and] participate in the process of 
structural transformation’.
However, disillusionment with the pace of change led to a gradual move away from
the idea of ‘development as struggle’ towards one of ‘development as delivery’
(Rutherford 2010). For a period of time ASA sought to combine popular education
with credit provision but by 1991, education was abandoned. The organisation
decided that it would move away from donor dependence and become a 
specialised and financially self-sufficient microcredit organisation. It shifted its
attention to organising women-only groups and adopted a streamlined version of
the Grameen model, tightening, standardising and decentralising its operations to
branch level where it relied on locally recruited staff with lower qualifications and
lower pay than other microfinance organisations. Its groups of around 10–35
members are made up of women from lower-income households who are married
and have at least one male breadwinner in the family. ASA also moved away from
the joint liability approach pioneered by Grameen to ensure loan repayment, and
relies instead on well-trained loan officers. These officers are responsible for
around 18–24 groups each. Each client has to save a minimum weekly amount
which is kept with the organisation but can be withdrawn at any time. Loans are
repaid in instalments across a yearly cycle. The groups meet once a week but
attendance is not mandatory. 
ASA has succeeded in its goal of becoming financially self-reliant. It ceased to
take grants from international donors in 2001 and loans from PKSF in 2003. The
bulk of its funding now comes from the savings of its membership and from its own
retained earnings (Rutherford 2010). By the end of 2007, it was serving 7 million
women, it had whittled down its costs to just 4 takas for every 10,000 takas
disbursed in loans and earned profits that were 60 per cent above its costs
(Rutherford 2010). Its pursuit of operational simplicity and massive scale ‘with a
vision unmatched in its clarity and relentlessness’ have placed ASA at the top of
the first ever list of the 50 most successful microfinance organisations in the
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2 See Rutherford (2010) for a vivid account of this transition.
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
16
world, compiled by Forbes Magazine in 2007. The indicators used by Forbes to
measure success were scale (the size of the loan portfolio), efficiency (cost of 
running the lending service), risk (likelihood of full loan repayment), and return
(profitability). 
Grameen Bank is the only organisation in our sample of six that did not have its
origins in the radical politics that dominated the NGO world in the 1970s. It was,
and remains, a provider of financial services to poor households, although it
underwent a major change in its approach in 2001. Its origins date back to 1976
when an action research project was undertaken by its founder to design a credit
delivery system targeted at the rural poor. The system was gradually expanded
until government legislation in 1983 transformed it into an independent bank.
While Grameen started out lending to both men and women, over time it has
come to focus exclusively on women on the grounds that they were both more
reliable in repaying their loans and were more effective agents of change within
the family. Women from poor households are organised into joint liability groups of
five so that group members guarantee each other’s loans and conventional 
collateral is not required. Loans are repaid at weekly meetings in small instalments
spread over a year. Borrowers are encouraged to save 5 per cent of the loan
amount with the Bank. Once borrowers have saved a predetermined amount
(US$3), they are entitled to one (and only one) share of the Bank. Today 92 per
cent of the Bank is owned by its borrowers while the Bangladesh government
owns the rest. 
In response to stresses experienced by borrowers in conforming to its rigid
requirements during devastating floods in 1997, Grameen has simplified its 
procedures considerably, abandoning joint liability and compulsory savings and
allowing members a much wider range of loan products. One of the social 
elements in Grameen’s approach is training of its members in organisational
pledges, ‘16 decisions’, which represent behavioural commitments to their children,
their family, their environment and the larger society. These are recited at the start
of every meeting. Grameen today has around 6 million members in Bangladesh
and has been replicated in various other parts of the world. Its founder was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
BRAC started out in 1972 as a short-term relief initiative and subsequently
became involved in development activities.3 It began with a community 
development approach, but its realisation that power inequalities within the 
community meant that the rural elite monopolised development efforts led it to
focus on the poorer sections of the community (BRAC 1983). Between 1973 and
1976, BRAC experimented with a number of different approaches, both the 
‘conscientisation’ and mobilisation of the poor through its Outreach Project as well
as a more conventional Rural Credit and Training project (Smillie 2009). By the
early 1980s, the Outreach project was phased out and in 1986, BRAC opted for
an integrated Rural Development Programme which sought to combine functional
education and training, provision of microcredit, income promotion and various
3 See Smillie (2009) for a history of BRAC.
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support services, including legal training and support. This also marked an
increasing focus on the targeting of women and by the mid-1990s, it began to
work almost exclusively with female borrowers (Nazneen 2007). 
Around 30–40 women are formed into ‘village organisations’ (VO) but divided into
smaller subgroups who have joint liability for loans which have to be approved by
the VO. Groups meet on a weekly basis with BRAC’s frontline workers for the 
distribution of loans, collection of repayments and savings contributions. Here too
there is the recitation of ‘18 promises’ at the start of every meeting. Financial training
is also provided and there is discussion around social and personal issues which
affect poor women. Saving is compulsory and intricately related to loans. Savings
are managed by BRAC and used as collateral for successive loans. Gram Sabha
or village councils are held every three months to discuss gender issues, including
dowry, polygamy, and violence against women. There is also a Social Development
programme which organises VO members into Polli Samaj which meet periodically
to discuss issues of concern to the membership. In addition, there has been a
Human Rights and Legal Services programme that seeks to educate BRAC 
members on basic rights and provide legal support. BRAC has grown into the
largest NGO in the developing world with programmes in Africa and other parts of
Asia. In Bangladesh alone, it employs around 97,000 people and was reaching
around 7 million clients, mainly women, by the end of 2007. BRAC’s founder was
awarded the first Clinton Global Citizen award in 2007 and knighted in 2010. 
PROSHIKA is the acronym of the Bengali terms for training, education and action.
It had an estimated 2.8 million group members by 2005 across the different 
districts of Bangladesh. It was set up in 1974 by a group of student activists 
interested in bringing about social change and it was registered as a formal
organisation in 1976. It focuses on men and women from landless and marginal
farming households. It regarded organisation building to be at the core of all its
programmes. Its members were organised into primary groups, called samities, of
around 20–25 members, with men and women organised separately. Groups were
provided with various forms of training and skills development and encouraged to
expand their income-generating activities with credit provided by the organisation.
There was a clear demarcation between savings and loans. There is a compulsory
minimum savings requirement but no compulsion to take loans. Savings are kept
with Proshika’s interest-bearing Savings Scheme and members can withdraw their
savings after a number of years. 
One feature which had differentiated Proshika from the more conventional 
microfinance organisations was that its credit programme was borrower-led and
managed; its groups, rather than programme staff, scrutinised loan use and 
collected instalments. This changed with the bureaucratisation of operations
across the microfinance sector in the late 1980s and by the mid-1990s, it was 
evident that the organisation was moving in the direction of the Grameen model
(Moore and Jain 2003; Ahmad 2003). Proshika ran into political difficulties with the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the party that came into power in the 2001
elections, because of the widespread perception that it had actively supported the
Awami League, the party that found itself in opposition. Proshika was pursued by
the BNP government, its director was gaoled for a period of time and its 
international funding was blocked. The organisation has been on the decline since
then. (For an account of Proshika’s work, see Seabrook 2001.)
Nijera Kori was founded initially as a relief-oriented initiative for destitute rural
women who had migrated to Dhaka during the famine of 1974. It became inactive
for a number of years. Nijera Kori in its current form began in 1980 when a group
of BRAC staff left the organisation after it moved away from its radical agenda
and into mainstream microcredit. NK is adamantly opposed to the provision of
credit and services by NGOs because it believes this will create relationships of
dependency between such organisations and their constituencies. Instead, NK
seeks to organise landless groups to claim their rights and demand accountability
from government and private service providers. NK uses a savings-led approach
as the basis of its group formation strategy. Groups are allowed to decide how
much they will save each week, keep control over their funds and decide how
they are to be used. Members are encouraged to keep their savings in a bank
account both on security grounds and to familiarise them with bank procedures. 
However, NK’s primary activity is training and mobilisation. Training is provided
through informal discussions in weekly meetings as well as in more structured
forms. One of the features which distinguishes NK from other organisations is the
clear separation between NK and the grassroots organisation that its supports.
This latter is called Bhumiheen Samity which federates the village-based 
bhumiheen samities at the higher thana level. NK and the Bhumiheen Samity
operate as parallel entities with parallel decision-making processes and elected
representatives making decisions within each structure. A study of NGOs in
Bangladesh described it as ‘uniquely democratic’ in that it allowed both its staff
and its members to elect their own representatives to each level of decision-
making (Stiles 2002: 124).4 Group members undergo various levels of training
and as they gain skills and confidence they become increasingly responsible for 
managing their own affairs, only turning to NK staff when they need specific 
support. It is estimated that it now has around 275,700 members, of whom more
than half are women. It works in 18 districts in different regions of Bangladesh
(Annual Report 2007–2008).
Samata started out in 1976 as a youth organisation that became involved in 
educating and organising landless people to claim their entitlements to khas land
(unused public land) in accordance with government legislation. It was registered
as a formal organisation in 1981 and has focused on building an effective 
grassroots organisation of poor women and men and promoting their capacity to
mobilise for their rights and against social injustice. The khas land recovery 
programme remains at the core of Samata’s activities (Jones, Yasmin, Gauchan
and Chowdhury 2007; Devine 2002). Samata’s groups vary from 15 to 20 
members and there may be several groups in a village. There is a Village
Advocacy Committee (VAC), 75 per cent of which is made up of representatives
from each group within a ward while the rest are drawn from sympathetic 
members of the community. There are similar committees at union, thana, district
and divisional level as well as Women’s Action Committees in each ward. 
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4 However, like all other major NGOs in Bangladesh, the executive director is exempt from election 
requirement.
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Like NK, Samata is opposed to NGO provision of microcredit. It also has a savings
programme. A minimum amount of savings is required and once funds have 
accumulated, a bank account is opened in the name of the group. Group members
decide how they will use their savings – loans to poor members or group loans.
The profit is shared by group members. The Executive Committee has 15 landless
member representatives and is headed by the Chairperson who is also a landless
member. The General Committee is formed with one representative for every 20
landless groups. Samata works with an extensive network of partner organisations
who help to amplify the voice and strength that the landless can bring to their
movement. Samata was estimated to have around 430,000 members in 2007, of
whom around 60 per cent were women. It works in seven districts in north-west
Bangladesh.
4 A note on survey methodology 
and description of  sample
There has been a considerable amount of research on development NGOs in
Bangladesh, but it is largely dominated by quantitative evaluations of microfinance
organisations and by a preoccupation with economic impacts, although there has
been some attention to women’s empowerment. The relatively smaller body of
research on the democratic relevance of NGOs tends to be qualitative in nature
and concentrated on the social mobilisation organisations (Devine 2002; Lewis
2007; Wood 2000; Kabeer 2003; Kabeer and Huq 2010; for an exception, see
Kabeer et al. 2009). This dualism in the literature on NGO impacts is likely to
reflect a strongly held belief by researchers about the underlying reality – the
belief that microfinance and other service-oriented NGOs were more likely to
achieve developmental impacts relating to livelihoods, assets and opportunities
while socially oriented NGOs were more likely to bring about changes in the 
political subjectivity and agency of their members. This was also the working
hypothesis with which we began our own research. 
The data collected for the research included both quantitative data generated by a
purposively designed survey which was carried out in 2007 as well as qualitative
data gathered through interviews with the staff of the organisations and a number
of key informants within the development community. The attribution strategy
adopted for the assessment of impacts was a comparison of 100 ‘new’ and 200
‘old’ members randomly selected from each of the six NGOs. ‘New’ members
were those who had joined the organisation within the previous six months (this
went up to one year in the case of Proshika) while ‘old’ members had joined at
least five years ago. In order to minimise variations in background factors due to
location differences, the study was carried out in the south-west region of
Bangladesh where all the six NGOs in question had branches. We randomly
selected one intervention area from the south-western districts covered by each
NGO. From the list of old (10–15 years) branches and new (1–2 years) branches
in each area we randomly selected two old and one new branch, and from each
branch we randomly selected 100 members. 
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Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 provide information on the organisations and their
membership. Some of the differences in the strategies of the six organisations are
summarised in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. They highlight the marked difference between
the programmes associated with the social mobilisation NGOs – Samata and NK,
compared with the minimalist microfinance NGOs – Grameen and ASA. ASA and
Grameen focus largely on finance-related services with some focus on loans for
social purposes. Of the intermediary organisations, Proshika tends towards the
social mobilisation end of the spectrum, combining microcredit with building 
‘people’s organisations’ through its federation structure and joint group activity
training, while BRAC tends towards the developmental end of the spectrum, 
combining microfinance with the provision of services and legal training. Samata
and NK place a great deal of emphasis on strengthening the collective capabilities
of poor women and men with a strong focus on group-managed savings 
programmes, group funds, rights training and federation building.
Table 4.1 Programme activities of study NGOs
Main programmes
Small loans for females; small loans for males (mainly 
agricultural loans for husbands of female members initiated
in 2005); small business loan; education loan; rehabilitation
loan; loans to hard-core poor and Monga loan; savings 
programme; ASA loan insurance; Members’ Security Fund
(life insurance); health assistance programme 
Income-generating loans; housing loans; education loans;
struggling member (beggar) loans; micro-enterprise loans;
flexible loans; seasonal loans; student scholarships; life
insurance; savings programme; deposit pension scheme
Economic development; health; education; social 
development; human rights and legal services
Peoples’ organisation building; microcredit and savings
services; employment and income-generating programme;
practical skill development training; small enterprise 
development programme; social and natural resource
development; human development training; universal 
education; good governance and advocacy; social forestry;
health programme; legal aid; women’s development; 
disaster management 
Raising awareness; building group solidarity; collective
action for rights, voice and accountability; advocacy and
alliances at the local, national and international levels; 
savings programme
Land rights; gender relations and development; 
democratisation programme; resource advocacy supports;
LAND network; policy advocacy; organisation building; 
savings programme; loans from group fund
Organisation
ASA
Grameen Bank
BRAC
Proshika
Nijera Kori
Samata
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Table 4.3 reports some basic characteristics of the sample. The exclusively
female membership of the three microfinance-dominated programmes is reflected
in the sample drawn for these organisations. The other point worth noting in Table
4.3 is the differences in the years of membership of the different organisations.
This reflects differences in the presence of the organisations in the selected 
locations. Thus Samata, NK and Proshika have all been working in the areas in
question since the early 1980s while BRAC, GB and ASA began work in the
selected areas in the mid to late 1990s. Years of membership will clearly make a
difference to the impacts an organisation is able to achieve and will be controlled
for at a later stage of the analysis. 
Organisation Group Sex Group Savings Credit Training Training in Joint group Federation
size fund in rights collective activity 
protest training
ASA 15–35 female No Yes Yes No No No No
Grameen 15–60 female No Yes Yes No No No No
Bank
BRAC 10–40 female No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Proshika 15–20 both No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nijera Kori 15–30 both Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Samata 10–20 both Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.2 NGO organisational strategies: similarities and differences
Samata Nijera Kori Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Bank
New members (nos.)
Male 50 40 20 – – –
Female 50 60 80 100 100 100
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Old members (nos.)
Male 100 100 40 – – –
Female 100 100 160 194* 200 200
Total 200 200 200 194 200 200
Duration of 
membership
New (months) 3.8 2.6 6.4 2.3 5.7 1.7
Old (years) 13 13 11 9 8 8
District location Pabna Khulna Madaripur Bagerhat Khulna Faridpur
5 This variable was used as our instrumental variable when testing for selection bias.
Table 4.3 Composition of sample by gender and duration of primary
NGO membership
Table 4.4 reports the reasons that respondents gave for joining the organisation in
question.5 It is evident that their reasons are highly clustered and vary considerably
by type of organisation. Clearly, organisational strategies play an important role in
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
22
Samata Nijera Kori Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Bank
Credit
New 0 1 82 94 80 95
Old 4 0 83 97 94 97
Savings
New 57 75 13 4 7 4
Old 31 9 15 3 3 2
Health services
New 0 4 2 0 0 0
Old 1 5 0 0 1 0
Children’s education
New 0 1 0 0 11 0
Old 0 1 0 0 1 0
Rights awareness
New 14 10 0 0 0 0
Old 37 50 0 0 0 0
Group support
New 7 6 2 2 0 0
Old 12 32 1 0 1 2
Access to khas land
New 22 0 0 0 0 0
Old 14 1 0 0 0 0
Main reasons for
joining
influencing why members join and remain within an organisation. Credit is the
overwhelming reason given by both old and new members of organisations offering
microfinance, even if, as in the case of BRAC and Proshika, the organisation also
offered other services. Savings are also mentioned by new Proshika members and
children’s education is mentioned by GB members. For Samata and NK, savings
constitute the primary reason given by both old and new members – a motivation
that barely features among other groups. The other finding of interest is the greater
importance given to rights awareness and group support by older members of
both NK and Samata. Access to khas land is mentioned as a reason for joining by
a sizeable minority of Samata members – a reflection of the organisation’s focus
on gaining rights to khas land for its members (Devine 2002; Jones et al. 2007).
Table 4.5 provides a summary of some key characteristics of our respondents and
their households. As might be expected, longer-standing members were older
than new ones. They were also more likely to be married than newer ones, again
to be expected. Divorced, widowed and abandoned respondents were almost
invariably female, an indication of the age difference between couples as well as
the greater ease with which men remarry in Bangladesh. The majority of members,
both old and new, are Muslims, the dominant religion of Bangladesh, but it is
worth noting the high percentage of non-Muslims, mainly Hindus, among older
members of NK, Proshika and ASA as well as among newer members of
Grameen. This is generally a function of the religious composition of the area
Table 4.4 Main reasons for joining NGO
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rather than an indication of positive or negative discrimination on the part of the
organisation. It is also worth noting that sizeable proportion of both old and new
members of some of the organisations were also members of other NGOs – a
factor that must be taken into account when seeking to attribute impact. 
Table 4.5 Respondent characteristics 
Samata Nijera Kori Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Bank
Mean age (years)
New 32 33 35 33 33 36
Old 43 43 41 43 39 38
Marital status: new
Married 78 77 80 91 91 95
Single 18 17 12 2 3 0
Divorced/widowed/ 4 6 8 7 6 5
abandoned
Marital status: old
Married 95 84 91 85 92 95
Single 2 3 1 0 0 0
Divorced/widowed/ 4 14 9 16 9 6
abandoned
Religion (Muslim)
New 98 76 92 95 50 97
Old 100 39 52 85 81 67
Education: new 
No formal education 52 41 44 24 37 62
Primary education 28 30 34 50 28 26
Secondary + 20 29 22 26 26 12
Education: old
No formal education 64 55 58 47 28 63
Primary education 24 22 26 37 37 21
Secondary + 13 24 17 16 36 18
Average level of 
household education
New 2.4 3.4 2.8 3.5 4.1 2.0
Old 2.1 3.1 2.5 2.7 4.2 2.0
Membership of 
other NGO (%)
New 18 28 40 47 34 60
Old 2 35 21 54 37 31
Proximity to 
tarmac road (%)
New 53.9 97.1 30.8 26.7 90.6 41.9
Old 80.4 82.0 78.4 80.1 83.9 39.0
Electricity (%)
New 94.1 97.1 78.3 100.0 100.0 86.3
Old 100.0 76.6 97.3 100.0 100.0 49.1
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
24
Adult education was used as our indicator of household economic status in Table 4.5
on the grounds that it is unlikely to have been influenced by membership of the
NGO in question. An examination of education levels of new members suggests
that ASA is recruiting among the poorer sections of the population – 62 per cent
had no formal education, the highest of all new groups. However, it has to be borne
in mind that the ASA sample is entirely female and would be expected to have
lower levels of education than samples that contain both men and women as in
the case of NK, Samata and Proshika. What we can say is that ASA has recruited
more women from poorer households than either Grameen or BRAC and possibly
Proshika as well. Of the two mixed samples, new NK members are somewhat 
better educated than Samata members. Average levels of education of all adult
members provide a better indicator for comparison. They suggest that ASA and
Samata members, both old and new, come from less educated households within
the sample while Grameen members come from more educated households.
Locational characteristics are captured by whether or not the household had 
electricity and its distance from a tarmac road. Clearly, differences in such 
characteristics between old and new members are likely to have a confounding effect
on the attribution of impact and will have to be taken into account in the analysis.
5 Assessing the impact of  NGO 
group membership: bivariate 
analysis
We now turn to an analysis of the impacts of membership, restricting ourselves at
this stage to descriptive statistics in order to get some idea of basic differences in the
impact indicators reported by new and long-standing members of the six 
organisations. At a later stage of the analysis, we will use regression analysis to
control for individual, household and location-specific characteristics that are likely
to have an influence on impact. We have divided our indicators of impact into four
categories. The first category deals with our development concerns. These are
captured by a number of poverty-reduction indicators that are widely used in the
Bangladesh literature: whether the household has experienced any food shortage in
the previous 12 months; whether it has consumed certain items of food that signal
an improvement in quality and diversity of diet; household ownership of productive
assets (cattle and land); and respondent’s access to paid work in the past year. 
Table 5.1 reports on these indicators. The clearest evidence of impact in relation 
to food security is to be found among members of Samata, NK and ASA: older 
members were significantly less likely to report experience of food shortage in the
previous 12 months than their new members. With the exception of Proshika, older
members of all other organisations groups reported an increase in the diversity of
their weekly diet compared to new members, but the difference was statistically
significant for Samata, NK, Grameen and ASA. Access to paid work in the past year
was generally high and while years of membership generally increased access,
the difference was only significant in the case of older NK and BRAC members. 
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
25
The final two indicators in Table 5.1 measure ownership of key productive assets
– cattle and land. In four of the organisations, duration of membership increased
the likelihood of owning cattle but the difference was only statistically significant in
the case of NK and BRAC. Counter-intuitively, longer-standing members of
Grameen were less likely to own cattle. A similar counter-intuitive finding prevails
for cultivable land ownership. Years of membership is associated with a greater
likelihood of owning 50 or more decimals of land except in the case of Grameen.6
The differences reported are statistically significant in all cases. 
Organisation New Members Old Members t-test
Samata 0.3431 0.1793 -3.1599***
Nijera Kori 0.5784 0.2813 -4.7459***
BRAC 0.3417 0.2808 -1.0676 
Proshika 0.3504 0.3791  +0.4826..
Grameen 0.2344 0.2332 .0.0198 
ASA 0.4194 0.3019 -2.0593**
Samata 0.4314 0.6304 +3.2982***
Nijera Kori 0.3137 0.4453 +2.0452**
BRAC 0.6333 0.6575 +0.4095 
Proshika 0.6667 0.6275 .-0.6651 
Grameen 0.6094 0.7202 +1.6678*
ASA 0.5081 0.6164 +1.8294*
Samata 0.9804 0.9674 -0.6369 
Nijera Kori 0.7843 0.9453 +3.7487***
BRAC 0.9083 0.9589 +1.6806*
Proshika 0.8974 0.9150 +0.4927 
Grameen 0.8594 0.9119 +1.2067 
ASA 0.9113 0.9182 +0.2075 
Samata 0.4118 0.4674 +0.9044 
Nijera Kori 0.3529 0.5000 +2.2499**
BRAC 0.3000 0.5822 +4.7756***
Proshika 0.5214 0.5359 +0.237 
Grameen 0.5156 0.3420 -2.4941**
ASA 0.5484 0.5409 .0.1254 
Samata 0.3627 0.7174 +6.2049***
Nijera Kori 0.2745 0.6563 +6.1922***
BRAC 0.4083 0.5137 +1.7172*
Proshika 0.3419 0.6144 +4.5919***
Grameen 0.5000 0.3420 -2.2694**
ASA 0.3468 0.4465 +1.7005*
Impact indicators
Food shortage in
the last year
Food diversity
Paid work
Assets: Cow(s)
Assets: Cultivable
land 
(>0.5 acre)
Table 5.1 Economic impacts (t-test of differences in sample 
proportions between old and new members)
6 Less than 50 decimals of cultivable land is generally taken to define ‘functional landlessness’ in 
Bangladesh.
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
This pattern of impacts is somewhat at odds with our expectation that the
strongest economic impacts would be reported by the microfinance organisations,
particularly those specialising in microfinance. Instead we find that impacts are
more widely distributed among the different organisations with at least one or
other of the two social mobilisation organisations reporting impact in relation to
each of our indicators. 
The next three tables report on different categories of indicators through which we
attempt to capture some of the everyday aspects of democracy as we might expect
them to play out in the lives of poor households. Table 5.2 reports on indicators
relating to participation within the life of the community, Table 5.3 on indicators of
participation in the domain of policy and politics at the local level, and Table 5.4
on perceptions and beliefs expressed by NGO members. We hope to use these
indicators to explore the extent to which NGO membership has served to promote
values and practices that might be expected to contribute to the democratisation
of everyday life. 
The first indicator in Table 5.2 relates to active participation in the shalish. The
shalish is the informal forum for dispensing justice and conflict resolution at the 
village level. It was traditionally dominated by the male elites of the village 
community and its proceedings were generally considered by the poor to be
loaded against them. However, they had little option but to accept its judgements.
This has been changing in recent years as NGO members have begun to 
participate actively in the shalish, often conducting their own if they feel they are
unlikely to obtain justice from the traditional ones. Women’s participation in these
proceedings is a particularly important break with the past. However, it is worth
noting that organisations with all-female membership reported much lower levels
of participation than the mixed-membership organisations. According to Table 5.2,
duration of membership was associated with increased likelihood of having 
participated in a shalish in the past five years for all six organisations but it is only
in the case of the two social mobilisation organisations, Samata and NK, that the
difference is significant. 
The next indicator deals with membership of village-level committees through
which local affairs (relating to schools, mosques/temples, markets and so on) are
managed. As with the village shalish, these are also dominated by members of the
better-off families in the village. It is evident from our table that participation by the
poorer sections of the population who make up our sample remains low overall
but that duration of membership of the social mobilisation organisations has led to
a significant increase in participation over time. 
The next two indicators capture more everyday aspects of influence at the village
level. Accompanying others to the government offices, like the police station,
health clinics and so on can be regarded as evidence of acting like a citizen, while
being consulted by others for advice and information testifies to the regard with
which one is held within one’s community. The quite high percentages of new
members reporting positive results on both these indicators suggest that simply
joining an NGO makes a difference. Apart from ASA and Proshika, duration of
membership of all the other organisations appears to have a further positive effect
on this, with longer-standing members far more likely to be consulted and to
accompany others to government offices than new members. 
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The final indicator of community participation related to various forms of collective
action – protests, campaigns, petitions – undertaken by NGO members around
questions of rights, entitlements and social justice. The pattern here is very clear.
Levels of collective action are generally low among new members, particularly so
in ASA, Grameen and BRAC. While duration of membership does generally
increase the likelihood of collective action, the difference is only substantive and
significant in the case of Samata and NK and, to a lesser extent, Proshika. These
differences in levels of collective action can obviously be traced to the emphasis
given by social mobilisation organisations to such forms of action as a means for
claiming their rights and addressing injustice. 
Table 5.3 provides some information on the kinds of issues around which NGO
members took action. Some of the differences in organisational values and 
Organisation New Members Old Members t-test
Samata 0.0588 0.1576 +2.459**
Nijera Kori 0.098 0.2734 +3.3997***
BRAC 0.0333 0.0205 .-0.6463
Proshika 0.0427 0.0784 +1.1954 
Grameen 0.0469 0.0363 .-0.3788 
ASA 0.0081 0.0189 +0.762 
Samata 0.1471 0.4402 +5.2488***
Nijera Kori 0.2451 0.3828 +2.2355**
BRAC 0.0667 0.089 +0.6714 
Proshika 0.1282 0.1634 +0.8046 
Grameen 0.0469 0.0933 +1.1726 
ASA 0.0161 0.0252 +0.5215 
Samata 0.1275 0.913             +21.0522***
Nijera Kori 0.1961 0.9063           +15.562***
BRAC 0.0667 0.1233 +1.5485 
Proshika 0.1368 0.3333 +3.7896***
Grameen 0.0156 0.0622 +1.4731 
ASA 0.0081 0.0252 +1.0814 
Samata 0.7059 0.9239 +5.0963***
Nijera Kori 0.598 0.750 +2.4819**
BRAC 0.6167 0.7671 +2.6887***
Proshika 0.7692 0.8235 +1.1037 
Grameen 0.6563 0.8705 +3.9416***
ASA 0.75 0.6981 .-0.9636 
Samata 0.4706 0.6196 +2.4523**
Nijera Kori 0.3137 0.4063 +1.4481 
BRAC 0.4500 0.5342 +1.3671 
Proshika 0.3932 0.6340 +4.0311***
Grameen 0.2813 0.6114 +4.7667***
ASA 0.5161 0.5031 .-0.216
Indicators
Member of at least
one village 
committee
Participated in a
shalish
Ever participated in
any praibad/
andolon (campaigns
and protests)
People in your
community come
to you for advice
Accompany people
to government
offices if needed?
Table 5.2 Community participation (t-test of differences in sample
proportions between old and new members)
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
strategies are evident in the Table. Samata members mobilised around a wider
range of issues than members of any other organisation and generally reported
higher levels of activism. Their members were particularly active around khas land
issues, around women’s rights, around violence and to a lesser extent around
service provision. NK members were particularly active around environmental
issues, around khas land and issues of justice and to a somewhat lesser extent
around women’s rights and violence. While Proshika members report much lower
levels of collective action than members of the other two, their main focus was on
women’s rights, justice and against corruption.
Table 5.3 Key issues
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Samata Nijera Kori Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Bank
Khas land
New 2 0 1 0
Old 84 30 1 0
Government services
New 0 1 2 1 0 0
Old 15 3 2 6 1 1
Agricultural inputs
New 0 0 1 0 0 0
Old  14 3 5 0 0 0
Women’s rights
New 2 3 3 5 0 1
Old 59 15 11 5 4 0
Environment
New 0 3 0 0 0 0
Old 1 70 3 0 0 0
Justice
New 0 0 6 1 0 0
Old 3 33 9 3 2 0
Violence
New 0 5 1 0 1 1
Old 25 17 7 0 0 0
Corruption
New 0 2 1 0 0 0
Old 3 6 13 0 0 0
Voting
New 0 0 0 0 0 0
Old 0 1 4 0 0 0
Issues around
which collective
action taken
Table 5.4 reports on indicators of participation in the domain of policy and politics:
voting behaviour, campaigning during elections and interactions with various
administrative and elected government officials. The thana is the lowest administrative
unit of the government and is headed by the Thana Nirbahi Officer (TNO) who is
responsible for the maintenance of law and order, collection of land revenue and
coordination of intersectoral development activities within the district. Thanas are
subdivided into unions which are managed by elected representatives – the Union
Parishad Chairman and Union Parishad (UP) members, who carry a great deal of
weight within the community, particularly in the distribution of public goods. Since
these public figures are largely drawn from the rural elite, they tend to be regarded
as somewhat remote figures of authority by the poorer sections of the community. 
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Table 5.4 Participation in domain of policy and politics (t-test of
differences in sample proportions between old and new members)
Organisation New Members Old Members t-test
Samata 0.0294 0.125 +2.7188***
Nijera Kori 0.098 0.3047 +3.9108***
BRAC 0.0417 0.1027 +1.8851*
Proshika 0.0769 0.1176 +1.1037 
Grameen 0.0625 0.0777 +0.4018 
ASA 0.0161 0.0377 +1.0866 
Samata 0.4706 0.7446 .-4.8124***
Nijera Kori 0.5196 0.7734 .-4.1728***
BRAC 0.55 0.5685 .-0.3013 
Proshika 0.6068 0.5882 ..0.3076 
Grameen 0.4219 0.5389 .-1.6244 
ASA 0.3871 0.4277 .-0.6868 
Samata 0.3137 0.7337 .-7.5339***
Nijera Kori 0.2647 0.4766 .-3.3493***
BRAC 0.125 0.0822 ..1.1489 
Proshika 0.1453 0.1569 .-0.2614 
Grameen 0.2031 0.1606 ..0.7801 
ASA 0.0161 0.0377 .-1.0866 
Samata 0.8137 0.9402 +3.3995***
Nijera Kori 0.8333 0.9688 +3.627***
BRAC 0.8583 0.9589 +2.9402***
Proshika 0.8205 0.9608 +3.8992***
Grameen 0.7500 0.9741 +6.04***
ASA 0.9194 0.9623 +1.5519 
Samata 0.8137 0.9402 +0.3995***
Nijera Kori 0.8333 0.9688 +3.627***
BRAC 0.8583 0.9589 +2.9402***
Proshika 0.8205 0.9608 +3.8992***
Grameen 0.7500 0.9741 +6.04***
ASA 0.9194 0.9623 +1.5519 
Samata 0.3039 0.4728 +2.8078***
Nijera Kori 0.2451 0.4063 +2.5993**
BRAC 0.0917 0.1712 +1.8933*
Proshika 0.3675 0.3072 .-1.0403 
Grameen 0.1719 0.2021 +0.5271 
ASA 0.0403 0.0629 +0.8389
Indicators
Sought out Thana
Nirbahi Officer
Sought out elected
Union Parishad
member 
Consulted by UP
chairman/member on
community matters
Voted in last
national elections
Voted in last local
election
Campaigned in last
UP election
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
We examine the extent to which this distance has been bridged through participation
in NGO groups. We find fairly low levels of interaction between NGO groups and
the TNO and this does not change a great deal with years of membership.
However, duration of membership does appear to make a significant difference in
the case of Samata, NK and, to a lesser extent, BRAC. There are generally higher
levels of interaction with the elected officials for all the NGOs – both in seeking
out the UP member or being consulted by the UP member or UP Chairman – but
differences by duration of membership are only significant for Samata and NK. 
The likelihood of having voted in the last national and local elections was extremely
high for all NGO group members – over 70 per cent for new members and over
90 per cent for old. Duration of membership made a significant difference in the
case of most organisations, with the exception of ASA. However, far fewer of them
were engaged in campaigning during elections. Table 5.4 reports on the proportions
who campaigned in the last local elections (much higher than those who campaigned
for national elections). There is considerable variation by organisation with 
generally higher levels of campaigning among the social mobilisation organisations.
Differences between old and new members are statistically significant in the case
of Samata, NK and BRAC. ASA, on the other hand, has the lowest levels of this
form of participation for both new and longer-standing members. 
Finally, Table 5.5 reports on indicators of beliefs, values and perceptions. The first of
these deals with perceptions in the quality of justice within the community in the last
10–15 years. Given the widespread perceptions of ‘bad governance’ in Bangladesh,
the percentages of new members in the different organisations who believe that it
has improved seem quite high. However, it is only in the case of Samata and NK
that duration of membership is associated with a significant increase in proportions
expressing this belief. With other groups, the differences are fairly small. 
Religion has been a major divisive factor within the subcontinent and Bangladesh
is no exception. Recent efforts to politicise religion by some mainstream parties as
well as fundamentalist groups have served to exacerbate mistrust between 
religious communities across the subcontinent. NGO membership appears to
have made some difference to this with fairly high proportions of both new and old
members expressing trust in people from other religions. In general, duration of
membership increases trust but only in the case of NK and BRAC is the difference
between new and old members significant. 
The next two indicators relate to the question of citizenship: to what extent do NGO
members regard themselves as citizens and to what extent do they accept equality
of citizenship for all members of the community? We find surprisingly high levels of
belief in own citizenship, particularly among the longer-standing members. This may
reflect the visibility of elections in people’s lives since the restoration of democracy
and the publicity given to voter education. Earlier qualitative research suggested
that a widespread view of citizenship associated it with the right to vote and that it
was only among the social mobilisation organisations that it was associated with a
broader set of rights (Kabeer and Haq Kabir 2009). If this is the case, then the
greater likelihood of voting among older members in all the organisations may
explain why awareness of self as a citizen is also generally higher among older
members. In this case, the difference between new and old is significant for all the
organisations except NK and ASA. 
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While the belief in the equality of citizenship is generally lower, it is still remarkably
high among both old and new members, given the extremely hierarchical nature of
social relations in the country. These views may signify that values are changing in
the Bangladesh countryside. In general, longer-standing members are more likely to
express these positive views about equality than new ones, suggesting that NGO
membership has an impact on their attitudes. However, the difference is only 
significant in the case of Samata. Finally, all NGO group members express high
levels of trust in each other and in the staff of their NGOs. While this trust increases
with duration of membership, the difference is only significant in the case of NK.
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Table 5.5 Values, beliefs and perceptions (t-test of differences in
sample proportions between old and new members)
Organisation New Members Old Members t-test
Samata 0.6078 0.9457 +7.9358***
Nijera Kori 0.5392 0.6875 +2.3206**
BRAC 0.5083 0.5685 +0.9779 
Proshika 0.547 0.5359 .-0.1801 
Grameen 0.5469 0.5544 +0.1046 
ASA 0.4597 0.5094 +0.8289 
Samata 0.5196 0.6196 +1.6448 
Nijera Kori 0.7549 0.8438 +1.6906*
BRAC 0.725 0.863 +2.8358***
Proshika 0.8632 0.7974 .-1.4143 
Grameen 0.7188 0.7668 +0.7729 
ASA 0.7177 0.7799 +1.2007 
Samata 0.9804 1.000 +1.9116*
Nijera Kori 0.8922 0.9453 +1.4919 
BRAC 0.8417 0.9452 +2.8132***
Proshika 0.7778 0.8627 +1.8292*
Grameen 0.9063 0.9741 +2.3393**
ASA 0.75 0.717 .-0.6201 
Samata 0.7745 0.9293 +3.866***
Nijera Kori 0.7157 0.7891 +1.2872 
BRAC 0.7 0.7808 +1.5044 
Proshika 0.6752 0.6993 +0.423 
Grameen 0.7969 0.8238 +0.4818 
ASA 0.5565 0.5283 .-0.47 
Samata 1.0000 1.0000
Nijera Kori 0.9314 0.9922 +2.5243**
BRAC 0.9917 0.9795 ..0.8125 
Proshika 0.9915 0.9935 ..0.1903 
Grameen 0.9844 0.9637 ..0.822 
ASA 0.9839 1.0000 +1.6088 
Samata 1.0000 1.0000
Nijera Kori 0.9510 0.9922 +1.9555*
BRAC 0.9750 0.9863 +0.6734 
Proshika 0.9829 0.9542 ..-1.2992 
Grameen 0.9688 0.9689 ..0.0064 
ASA 0.9919 0.9874 ..0.3667
Indicators
Believe there has
been improvement
in quality of justice in
the last 10-15 years
Trust people from
other religions
Think of self as a
citizen
All members of the
community are
equal citizens
Trust own NGO
group members
Trust own NGO
staff
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
6 Assessing the impact of  NGO 
group membership: multivariate 
analysis
The results of our bivariate analysis provide us with a general pattern of the 
variation of impact indicators by NGO membership. They suggest that the social
mobilisation organisations perform surprisingly well on both economic, community
and political impacts. There is considerable variation in the impacts reported by the
other organisations but in general, the two ‘mixed’ organisations (BRAC and Proshika)
do better than the more narrowly focused microfinance organisations on the social
and political impacts while the latter do somewhat better on economic impacts. 
As we pointed out in our earlier discussion, there are a number of differences in the
characteristics of the respondents from various NGOs that are likely to have a bearing
on our impact indicators. In the next stage of the analysis, we carry out regression
analysis to control for some of these confounding variables. Before carrying out the
analysis, however, we sought to control for the effects of selection bias into different
NGOs as this could affect the outcomes. For instance, it may be the case that
people with stronger entrepreneurial skills will opt to join organisations with a strong
emphasis on microfinance – or those more politically aware might opt in favour of
social mobilisation organisations. Consequently, differences in impacts reported
for different organisations may reflect these characteristics rather than reflecting
the influence of organisational membership. The problem is that we do not know
which of these characteristics will influence outcomes in order to include them in
the survey. The effects of these unobserved characteristics on outcome indicators
are commonly referred to in the literature as selection bias (Heckman 1979). 
The econometric solution to this problem involves controlling for the probability of
selection. This implies estimating a discrete choice model (i.e., probit for two 
outcomes, multinomial logit for three or more) and then obtaining selection terms
which are then inserted as additional regressors into the equation. The intuition
behind this procedure draws on the idea that those unobserved factors causing
selection bias are condensed into the residuals of the selection equation. 
In order to test for the effects of selection bias, we implemented two different 
procedures. The first one involved a multinomial logit model in which the dependent
variable was categorical in nature and depicted the membership of the six 
organisations included in this study using the procedure suggested by Lee (1983)
(see Appendix 1). Selection effects from this model were then inserted into probit
equations. Our identification strategy included variables which captured the reasons
given for joining an NGO. The second procedure involved a bivariate probit where
the first probit models the probability of participating or not in a given NGO and the
second comprises the determinants of different development outcomes. Almost
invariably, selection effects proved statistically insignificant using both methods. 
The fact that we could not find any evidence of selection bias does not, of course,
mean that it doesn’t exist. The continued debates about the evidence on the
impacts of microfinance, despite the sophistication of the econometric methodologies
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used, testify to the difficulties of resolving this issue. However, we have attempted
to test for selection bias to the best of our ability with the data at our disposal and
are reasonably confident that the results presented here are an accurate 
representation of differences in the impacts achieved by the six organisations 
represented in our sample. In addition, once we have reported on our findings, we
will draw on a wider body of literature in order to interpret our findings. 
For the multivariate impact analysis, all our impact variables were translated into
dichotomous variables and analysed using probit regression techniques. Rather
than presenting conventional probit coefficients, we have opted to report marginal/
impact effects computed at the average of sample characteristics for greater 
simplicity of interpretation.7 The estimation procedure was carried out separately
for each NGO and allows us to see how each performed in relation to our 
indicators of impact. 
The most important explanatory variable from the point of view of our interest in
impact was number of years of membership of an NGO. This was specified as a
continuous variable in the regression. In addition, our specification controlled for
the effects of individual characteristics (age and its quadratic term, dummies for
partial and completed primary education, gender, religion and membership of a
second NGO). Socioeconomic status of the household was controlled for with the
average number of years of formal schooling amongst the rest of the adults in the
respondent’s household. We also include two village characteristics – one
dichotomous variable for villages located less than five miles away from a paved
road and another for electricity. 
Our first set of findings relate to the economic impacts (Tables A2-2.1 to A2-2.5 in
Appendix 2). These were captured by dichotomous versions of the indicators used
earlier: whether the household had experienced food shortage in the past year;
whether the household had eaten at least four out of six food items included in the
survey; whether the respondent had access to paid work in the past year; whether
or not the household had at least 50 decimals (half an acre) of cultivable land
(those with less are conventionally defined as ‘functionally landless’ in the
Bangladesh context); whether the household owned any cows).
We begin with some comments on the marginal/impact effects of individual 
characteristics. Age appears to have a bearing on the likelihood of food shortage
in the previous year, with older members less likely to report food shortage in the
case of Samata but more likely to do so in the case of Proshika and Grameen. It
also – and not unexpectedly – has a strong impact on likelihood of paid work,
increasing up to a certain age and then declining. Respondent’s education
appears to have negligible impact on economic indicators but the average level of
education of household members does appear to reduce the likelihood of food
shortages for a number of NGOs. Membership of other NGOs only has a 
significant impact on economic indicators for certain NGOs and for some of the
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7 The computation of marginal effects at the mean of sample characteristics may be potentially biased 
in cases when the observed probability of the outcome is very low or high. However, alternative 
procedures in order to avoid this problem (i.e., using the mean values of sub-sample characteristics for
different NGOs) complicate the estimation of the sampling variance for informed statistical inference.
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indictors and the impact is not always in the same positive or negative direction. The
main impact of religion appears to be in relation to ownership of cows but, again,
impact is not always in the same direction. The impact of gender is mediated by
the fact that not all the organisations had male members. Of those that did, gender
was not generally relevant to the household-level impacts reported but, where it
was significant, women generally reported lower levels of impact than men. 
Where proximity to paved roads was found to be significant, the impact was 
generally positive with regard to food security and diversity of diet although 
interestingly not so in the case of likelihood of paid work in the past year.
Surprisingly, living in a village with electricity does not have a statistically significant
effect on the economic indicators included here. It may be that this result is driven
by the fact that we are also controlling for the effects of other personal and 
household characteristics that are concomitant to location. 
We turn next to the impact of NGO membership. Our probit estimates suggest that
duration of membership generally had a positive impact on household economic
indicators but the results were not always significant. Focusing on the significant
results we find that duration of membership had a positive impact on:
– food shortage in the previous year among NK members
– diversity of diet in the previous week among NK and GB members
– likelihood of paid work in the previous year among BRAC, Proshika and, more
weakly, NK
– the likelihood of having at least half an acre of cultivable land among Samata,
NK and Proshika members 
– likelihood of owning cows among BRAC members.
Regression estimates for the community participation indicators are reported in
Tables A2-2.1 to A2-2.4 in Appendix 2. The indicators here were whether an NGO
member: accompanied others to government offices; participated in a shalish in
the past 5 years; was approached by others in the community for advice and 
information; participated in collective action around rights and social justice. Age
appears to be associated with increasing likelihood of accompanying others to
various offices where necessary, being consulted for advice by members of the
community and to participating in a shalish, but only up to a certain point, after
which there is a decline.
The other independent variables – education of individuals and at the household
level, membership of another NGO, religion and location characteristics – did not
display any consistent pattern across the six NGOs but women were generally
less likely than men to give positive answers. Given the constraints on women’s
mobility, this is a fairly predictable finding. As far as primary NGO membership is
concerned, our results suggest that duration of membership generally had a 
positive impact on community participation but that the impact was often small and
statistically insignificant, with some exceptions. Duration of membership was
found to have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of: 
– participation in a shalish among Samata and Proshika members
– participation in at least one village-level committee  
– accompanying people to various offices among Proshika and GB members
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– being consulted by others for information and advice among Samata and 
Grameen Bank members
– collective action against injustice among NK and Proshika members.
Tables A2-3.1 to A2-3.4 in Appendix 2 report on the results of regressions relating
to engagement with policy and politics at the local level. The four indicators used
to measure this were: interaction with the TNO; interaction with UP member; 
consultation by UP Chairman; and campaigning in the last local election. Age
appears to be a less consistently relevant factor in explaining variations in 
participation in the domain of policy and politics but where it proves significant, the
pattern is similar to that reported in previous results – increasing likelihood of
impact up to a certain age and then a decline. 
The respondent’s education appears to have little impact on this set of indicators
but average level of education in the household does influence the likelihood of
interacting with the TNO and being consulted by the UP Chairman in the case of a
number of NGOs. Where religion has a significant impact, it generally suggests
that Hindus are less likely to interact with elected and government officials and are
less likely to campaign in local elections. This is not unexpected given the 
discrimination faced by religious minorities in the country. The other predictable
finding is that women are generally less active than men in policy and political life.
Location variables appear to have some impact in the case of NK members, 
suggesting that they may have been more geographically dispersed than the others.
Turning to the impact of NGO membership, duration of membership is less 
consistently positive than was the case for our other impact indicators, although
the size of negative impacts is generally small. Focusing on the significant results,
we find that duration of membership had a positive impact on likelihood of:
– interaction with the TNO among NK, Samata and Proshika members 
– interaction with a UP member among Samata members 
– consultation by UP Chairman among Samata members
– campaigning in last UP elections among Samata, NK and BRAC members.
Tables A2-4.1 to A2-4.4 in Appendix 2 report on our final set of indicators, those
relating to beliefs, values and perceptions: whether NGO members believed that
the quality of justice had improved within their community over the past 10–15
years; whether they trusted people from other religions; whether they believed
themselves to be citizens; and whether they believed that all members of the 
community were equal citizens. (Perfect correlation meant results for trust in own
and other NGO members were not meaningful.) While duration of membership
generally promotes positive impacts in relation to these indicators, this is not 
consistently the case. The results suggest that duration of membership had 
statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of: 
– the view that there had been an improvement in the quality of justice in recent
years in the case of NK and Samata members
– the belief in own citizenship status among Proshika members and more 
weakly among BRAC and GB members
– the belief that all members of the community are equal citizens in the case of 
BRAC members 
– trust in people from other religions in the case of Samata members.
The active participation by NK and Samata members in informal justice proceedings
and their willingness to take collective action against instances of injustice may
explain why they, more than other group, believed that there has been an
improvement in the quality of justice within their community over time. As we noted
earlier, most of our respondents believed themselves to be citizens, with longer-
standing members more likely to express this view. We also noted that a high 
percentage of all groups, particularly the longer-standing ones, also expressed the
view that all members of the community were equal citizens. Our econometric
analysis suggests that individual NGO membership may not be the key factor 
driving these views, although the NGOs as a community may have played an
important role in disseminating these ideas. A similar point can be made with
respect to trust in people from other religions. However, duration of membership of
BRAC appears to have had some impact on the belief in equality among members
while membership of Samata appears to have strengthened trust in people from
other religions. 
We are now in a position to take stock of our findings. Table 6.1 summarises the
marginal impact/effects of years of membership from our probit analysis. It allows
a graphic presentation of how different organisations performed in relation to the
indicators of impact explored in our study. The results are somewhat contrary to
what we expected to find. We began with the assumption that minimalist 
microfinance organisations would perform well on the development indicators
while the pure social mobilisation organisations would perform well on the 
governance indicators. We had no prior assumptions about whether the two
‘mixed’ NGOs would perform better on democracy or development. 
The actual pattern of impacts is rather different. While it is the case that Samata
does indeed perform better than the other organisations on the democracy 
indicators, ASA performs extremely poorly on all our indicators, both in terms of
development as well as democracy. NK does not score as highly as Samata on
the ‘democracy’ indicators, but it performs more strongly on the economic 
indicators than Samata and other organisations. The other organisations have
mixed results, reporting both development and democracy impacts. However, if
we simply count the number of significant impacts reported by each organisation,
we find that they decline consistently as we move from the social mobilisation end
of the spectrum to the microfinance end. 
It could be argued that the failure of the minimalist microfinance organisations to
report strong economic impacts may reflect the fact that their more successful
members have left the organisation as they no longer need microcredit and remaining
older members represent the poorer and less successful members. There are a
number of reasons to question this interpretation. First of all, the evidence suggests
that poorer households are most likely to be excluded from microfinance groups
because of their inability to keep up their repayments (Zaman 1997; Hashemi 1997).
For the same reasons, they are more likely to predominate among the dropouts.
There is also evidence that microcredit is not ‘scale-neutral’: it is the better-off
sections of the poor that benefit most from loans while the poorer sections received
fewer benefits (Hulme and Mosley 1997) – another reason to expect that those who
remain are the more successful. Finally, the pressure on microfinance organisations
to become financially sustainable has led to incentive structures which lead staff
to concentrate on recruiting and retaining better-off sections of the poor. 
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
36
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
37
Samata Nijera Kori Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Bank
Food shortage -.026***
(.006)
Food diversity .011** .016*
(.005) (.009)
Paid work .004* .008*0 .008*
(.002) (.004)0 (.003)
Ownership of at least 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.023*** -0.024**
half an acre of land (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)000 (0.010)0
Ownership of cows .027***
(.009)0
Accompany others .017*** .044***
to offices (.006)0 (.011)
Participation in .011** .007**
shalish (.004) (.003)0
Membership of a 0.003*00
committee (0.002)00
Consulted for advice .008** .020***
(.003)0 (.007)
Participation in .049*** .059*** .012***
collective action (.006)0 (.007)0 (.005)0
Interaction with TNO .005** .009*** .006**
(.002)0 (.003)0 (.003)0
Interaction with UP .011** 
member (.005)0
Consultation by UP .024*** 
Chair (.005)0
Campaigning in .014*** 0.10*00
local election (.005)0 (.006)0
Quality of justice .012*** .013** 
has improved (.004)0 (.005)0
Thinks of self as .009** .010*0 .005*
citizen (.004)0 (.005)0 (.002)0
All are equal .015* 
citizens (.008)0
Trust in people from .011**
other religions (.005)0
No. of significant 9 9 8 5 4 0
results+
Standard errors in parentheses: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%
+ Number of statistically significant development outcomes from probit marginal effects.
See Appendix 2 for details
Table 6.1 Summary of findings relating to impact of duration of
NGO membership
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
38
On the other hand, it may well be that the more politically motivated are not only
more likely to join the social mobilisation organisations but also to remain within
them. The greater evidence of political and social impacts among older members
of these organisations may reflect this bias. At the same time, it should be borne
in mind that it was the strong qualitative evidence provided by members of these
organisations describing the major changes that had been brought about in their
lives by the organisations in question, that provided the motivation to attempt to
quantify the impacts they described. If their evidence is to be believed, then the
strategies adopted by these organisations played an important role in politicising
their members and building their willingness and capacity to engage actively in the
domain of policy and politics.
7 Interpreting the results: 
organisational strategies matter
Our research has therefore generated a number of counter-intuitive findings that
clearly need further empirical investigation. For the purposes of this paper, we will
draw on the secondary literature to provide some possible explanations. First of
all, however, we need to make it clear that we do not believe that our findings are
nationally representative. They relate to a particular region of Bangladesh and there
is sufficient regional variation in the Bangladesh context to be cautious about
assuming that findings from one region can be generalised to the rest of the 
country. The extent to which evidence from other studies supports or contradicts our
own findings would clearly go some way towards establishing how generalisable
they are. Unfortunately, differences in sample size, methodology and questions
asked in these various studies undermine how much confidence we can attach to
these comparisons. 
The first counter-intuitive result of our study relates to the social mobilisation NGOs.
We had expected to find that social mobilisation organisations would perform well
on our indicators of grassroots governance and this has been borne out by our
results. Our own earlier studies as well as the secondary literature provide 
important qualitative insights into the processes through which social mobilisation
organisations have been able to promote democratic ideas and practices at the
grassroots level. They pointed to the importance of the analytical and leadership
skills these organisations offer their membership, the promotion of solidarity 
relationships, education about rights and entitlements and support in tackling
injustice (Kabeer 2003; Kabeer et al. 2009; Christensen 1999; Barkat, Halim,
Poddar, Osman and Badiuzzaman 2008;8 Devine 2002; Jones et al. 2007). It is
also evident that these organisations are active in promoting the rights of others
around them, challenging unjust verdicts of traditional village shalish and often 
8 Barkat et al. (2008) provide a particularly interesting attempt to map the relationship between the kinds
of training NK provided its members and the kinds of issues around which they mobilised.
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initiating their own, ensuring the proper distribution of entitlements intended for the
poor, challenging corruption on the part of government officials and playing an
active role in local politics. Kabeer (2003), Kabeer and Haq Kabir (2009) and
Barkat et al. (2008) all provide detailed accounts of how, over time, social 
mobilisation organisations build up their members’ capacity to mobilise within the
community and challenge injustice. 
What we did not expect to find are the strong economic impacts associated with
social mobilisation organisations, particularly so in the case of NK, given that they
do not appear to deliver any direct economic resources to their members. While
our bivariate analysis suggested a range of economic impacts for both Samata
and NK, these disappeared for Samata (with the exception of cultivable land 
holdings) but persisted for NK, once differences in individual and household 
characteristics of members had been controlled for.9 This is a puzzling result
because key aspects of the strategies of the two organisations are, on the face of
it, extremely similar. 
As we pointed out in an earlier section, there are very few studies attempting to
quantify the impacts of social mobilisation organisations but we drew on what we
were able to find to establish whether our findings were supported by other studies.
Kabeer et al. (2009) attempt to quantify the impacts of NK, using indicators very
similar to those used here but in a different geographical location. As in the 
present study, they also found economic and social impacts reported by NK 
members persisted after controlling for difference in individual, household and
location characteristics of members of both NK and a control group.10
We were able to find one attempt to quantify Samata’s economic impacts − an
evaluation by Jones et al. (2007), located in the same district as our Samata
respondents. The study used basic cross-tabulations to compare Samata group
members with a small control group of non-members. The results showed strong
evidence of economic impacts, as did our bivariate analysis. However, no attempt
was made to report on the significance of the findings or to control for differences
in the characteristics of Samata and control group members. This was the stage
in our study at which the evidence of economic impacts disappeared. What Jones
et al. did point to was the importance of the khas reclamation programme in
Samata’s activities. This, together with our own evidence of the high level of 
collective action around land issues, may explain why it was in relation to land
that Samata had its strongest impact.
There are some pointers from our own field work and from the secondary literature
on the two organisations that suggest possible routes through which differences in
their economic impacts might have operated. The first is their voluntary savings
programme. While both organisations share this feature, our interviews with
Samata staff members suggest that savings did not occupy the central place in its
9 In the case of Samata, greater proximity to roads among older members was an important factor in 
explaining their stronger economic performance.
10 However, they do not find that membership of NK increased food security, contrary to the findings of 
the present study.
strategies.11 This is not the case with NK which sees the weekly savings programme
as an activity which brings its groups together around a shared asset: ‘groups that
stopped saving were said to be closed’ (Rutherford 2010: 80). NK’s savings 
programme also has a very practical function and was shrewdly managed: ‘though
there was talk of the savings being available in case any social action needed
support, the NK savings are mostly being accumulated for investment. The 
investment is done carefully to minimize the risk of the savings being captured’
(Rutherford 2010: 181). 
What is also important is that group members manage their own savings, deciding
collectively how much to save each week and how the savings will be utilised.
This builds financial capabilities of a very different kind from the individualised
financial management skills associated with microfinance groups. Their capacity
to save may be one factor in explaining the higher rates of economic activity and
landholdings among longer-standing NK members observed in this study. It
should be noted that the study by Kabeer et al. (2009) also found that duration of
membership had significant impacts on the productive asset holdings of NK
households. 
The increased rates of economic activity associated with NK membership may
also reflect the training provided by the organisation − a second route through
which economic change may take place. Such training may feed directly into 
livelihood skills but it has other indirect effects as well. NK members are generally
more aware of their rights than most poor people, more willing to bargain for 
higher wages or a fairer price for their labour and products, more able to access
the services of government extension services. The capacity to bargain for fairer
wages, rather than accepting the wage set by employers, was noted in an early
study of NK members in Rajshahi district (Ali, Mustaque and Sarkar 1998). In the
present survey as well, while most of the respondents in our sample said that they
knew how to bargain for fair prices for their goods, much higher percentages of
older NK members than any other group, including Samata, said that they were
also able to bargain for fairer wages. It may be the ability of an organisation to
promote this broader notion of human capability among their membership, the
‘intangible’ skills of economic literacy, negotiating capacity, rights awareness and
knowledge of how to follow through on claiming and enforcing rights, that explains
their ability to make economic improvements, despite the lack of economic 
support. 
The third route is the membership of other NGOs, mainly microfinance 
organisations. This is one of the key factors which differentiates NK’s membership
from that of Samata in our study: 28 per cent of NK’s new members belonged to
another NGO compared to 18 per cent of Samata’s, while 35 per cent of its old
members belonged to another NGO compared to just 2 per cent of Samata’s
(Table 4.5). We have, of course, controlled for membership of alternative 
organisations: the impacts associated with alternative membership are generally
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11 It is worth noting that the savings programme is barely mentioned in a recent impact assessment of 
Samata (Jones et al. 2007).
positive, although not statistically significant in this study.12 However, in their
quantitative analysis of NK’s impacts, which also controlled for dual NGO 
membership, Kabeer et al. (2009) found that membership of a second NGO
served to significantly strengthen the positive economic and other impacts 
associated with NK membership. 
A qualitative study by Kabeer (2003) suggests that dual membership of different
categories of NGOs promotes appreciation of the relative strengths of different
types of NGOs. It reports on the reasons given by respondents in her study who
belonged to both Grameen Bank and NK. 
We are all poor people. For us to get hold of three or four thousand takas at
one time is not easy. That is why we are members of Grameen Bank. If we
get a loan of five thousand takas, we can then go and get some material to
work our looms. We can go and buy thread and other things. Then we work
this investment for a year, and we can make a good profit. Say, on a five
thousand taka loan, you get ten thousand takas back. With that, we can pay
back the instalments, we can buy food, we are able to improve our situation.
But with Nijera Kori, we have savings when we need it. That is something. And
we are united. No one can stop us. If someone comes to beat one of us, we all
sort out the matter together. Grameen would not have done this for us. They
give us loans and take them back. That is what they are concerned about. 
With Grameen Bank, it is like this, my relationship to them is based on the
loans. Even if someone has died in your family, you have to pay your 
instalment. That is the agreement you reach with them when you join... As to
how we might change our ideas, how we can be given a way to think about
how we might improve ourselves, this is not something that they do. With
Nijera Kori our money stays with us. They don’t give us money but they give
us good advice. How we can improve our lives, or what will be good for us in
order to create a better future for ourselves. We were ignorant before, now we
have become wise. 
(Kabeer 2003: 21–2)
Similar views were expressed to Rutherford in his interview with an NK member
whose father had lost his arm as a result of the failure of the authorities to maintain
their equipment in proper working order. Her requests for compensation were
refused until NK group members led villagers in a procession to successfully 
pressure the authorities into providing compensation. The rest of the money for
his treatment was raised through loans from various microcredit organisations.
Reflecting on the kinds of support she had received, the NK member said, ‘Well,
both helped me with my problem with my father... one helped me directly with the
procession and all that, and the others helped me indirectly with the loans. We
need both kinds of help’ (Rutherford 2010: 182).
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
41
12 This may reflect the fact that we do not have any information on duration of membership of these 
other organisations, so that the variable in question lumps together members who may have just 
joined the organisation and others who may have been members for an extended period of time.
The second counter-intuitive finding from our study is the failure of a minimalist
microfinance organisation, dedicated to promoting the livelihoods of its members,
to report any significant economic impacts. There is a lively debate about the 
contribution of microfinance to the alleviation and reduction of poverty with 
contradictory findings, even within the context of Bangladesh. Some claim impact
on both long- and short-term poverty while others find little evidence of any
impact, beyond consumption-smoothing (Khandker 1998 and 2005; Morduch
1998; Pitt 1999; Roodman and Morduch 2009). However, the majority of these
studies deal with Grameen, BRAC and, to a lesser extent, Proshika. 
Despite its pre-eminent position in the world of microfinance, we found remarkably
few studies attempting to quantify ASA’s impact. There is some literature attesting
to its success in outreach to the poor, its success in recovering loans and its
move from donor dependency to financial sustainability (Rutherford 1995 and
2010; Jain 1997 and nd; Sagar 2004) but a glaring dearth of studies dealing with
its impact on poor people’s livelihoods. It may be that as ASA became increasingly
reliant on its own funds, it has not seen the need to demonstrate its impact for the
benefit of its donors. 
We were able to track down three studies which did provide some quantification of
ASA’s impact13 though none went beyond descriptive statistical analysis. Ahsan
(2005) examined the economic impact of BRAC, ASA and Grameen Bank in
Gaibandha district but had a fairly small sample (92 respondents) of whom only
26 belonged to ASA. It also examined a very limited range of impacts. It found
that the majority of the members of each of these organisations believed that their
economic situation had improved since taking loans, the majority were involved in
income-generating activities, most of them believed that their increased income
had helped to alleviate their poverty but a considerably higher percentage of ASA
members (50 per cent) did not believe that there was any relationship between
access to microcredit and income generation compared to the other two 
organisation (10 per cent and 14 per cent)!
The second study we consulted was commissioned by ASA’s donors in 1997
(Bruntrup, Alauddin, Huda and Rahman 1997). It used a comparison of 483
households of new and old members as well as a control group of non-members.
In general, it found higher levels of income among older ASA members, greater
employment of wage labour as well as larger holdings of productive land but little
difference in terms of other productive assets (e.g. livestock, housing). However,
no attempt was made to control for any differences in the characteristics of the
two groups that might have contributed to these findings. 
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13 We did find a fourth study carried out by ASA Credit Officers (ASA 2002) but the methodology used 
was too flawed to give much credence to its extremely positive findings on economic and social fronts 
(over 90 per cent of the women interviewed gave positive responses to almost all the questions put to 
them). First of all, the study was carried out by ASA’s own Credit Officers − the very people whose 
effectiveness was under scrutiny. Secondly, there was no attempt to use any form of control group or 
baseline in order to establish whether the positive responses could be attributed to women’s association
with ASA. Thirdly, while the study relied on focus group discussions with 972 groups (adding up to 
around 18,000 women), the findings report on percentages of women giving particular responses, with
no explanation as to how group-based responses were translated into individual responses.
The most recent study was carried out by ASA’s own Research and
Documentation Cell and the results are posted on its website. It was based on a
sample of over 3000 older members drawn from different regions of Bangladesh,
and examined impacts over the past three years The study found that the vast
majority of ASA members reported increases in their business capital, their
monthly income and in employment generation. Lower percentages (around
50–60 per cent) reported increases in land and livestock. 
Our own findings on ASA lend strong support to those who have argued that the
provision of financial services on their own will not have a significant impact on
the livelihoods of the poor. At the same time, it is important to note what is at
issue here is not the economic effectiveness of microfinance per se but an
extremely pared-down version of microfinance. Grameen Bank not only achieved
more economic impacts than ASA in our study but also had a positive impact on
one of the community participation indicators as well. Despite our classification of
ASA and Grameen as minimalist microfinance organisations, they differ in some
important ways, neatly summarised in Rutherford’s comment about their founding
directors: ‘Shafiq (ASA) hammers on about efficiency, standardisation and 
sustainability whereas Yunus (Grameen) prefers to talk about lifting people out of
poverty’ (Rutherford 2010: 161). 
ASA has been described by the Asian Development Bank’s newsletter as the
‘Ford Motor Model of Microfinance’ because of its success in standardising and
scaling up its operations (Fernando and Meyer 2002). It exemplifies what
Robinson (2001) termed the financial sustainability model of microfinance: its 
driving force was indeed the need for financial sustainability, both for itself and for
the women it provided financial services to. However, our study suggests that it
appears to have succeeded in the first14 but not in the second. Not only are the
women who belong to ASA among the least active within community and political
life but they are also least likely to report any impact in terms of food security,
diversity of diet, access to paid work or accumulation of productive assets. 
Grameen Bank was cited by Robinson (2001) as her example of a poverty lending
model. Its primary goal is poverty reduction through financial services tailored to
the needs of poor people and it has no problems in using subsidies to achieve its
ends. This commitment to poverty reduction as a founding principle may be what
distinguishes GB from ASA as far as impacts are concerned. It forms the ethos of
the organisation, permeating its culture and approach to financial services. Its
housing loan, for instance, is conditional on households registering homestead
land in women’s names − an important route through which an important asset is
transferred to women in a culture where very few of them are able to inherit land.
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
43
14 It is worth noting that both ASA and BRAC have been very reluctant to reduce interest rates (from the 
nominal 15 per cent or effective 30 per cent to the PKSF-stipulated nominal 12.5 per cent). The 
rationale for this was to pass on part of the benefit of increased efficiency to the borrowers in terms of 
lower interest rates instead of using the surplus from credit operations for increasing the size of the 
organisation’s revolving fund. While BRAC’s reluctance to lower interest rates might be justified on 
developmental grounds by the argument that it diverts its surpluses to its social programmes, ASA 
appeared to be motivated by the desire to accumulate.
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Its members are shareholders on its board even if they do not actually exercise a
great deal of voice. Grameen has sought to provide small loans to beggars, 
something that is unlikely to find favour in the financial sustainability model. And it
successfully promoted the use of the mobile phone as a form of business among
village women, an innovation that reflected its confidence in the capacity of these
women to respond to new opportunities. 
Impact assessment studies of Grameen (and BRAC) have indicated a positive
impact on economic indicators as well as attesting to important social impacts
(Khandker 1998 and 2005; Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996), although the 
economic impacts have also been contested (Morduch 1998; Roodman and
Morduch 2009). None of these studies investigates impacts relating to community
participation and engagement with politics. It is worth noting that Grameen came
17th in Forbes Magazine’s list of the 50 most successful microfinance 
organisations, where success is defined almost entirely in terms of commercial
viability. The transition to Grameen II may, as Rutherford points out, bring its
approach closer to the ASA model but our findings suggest that it has retained its
focus on poverty reduction.15
Finally, we turn next to the two intermediate organisations in our study.
Microfinance forms the backbone of the programmes of both BRAC and Proshika
but it is supplemented by a range of other services, including livelihoods training,
social services, legal advice and support as well as, in the case of Proshika,
social mobilisation. Our findings show that BRAC performs somewhat better on
development impacts while Proshika performs better on the political front. This
pattern conforms to our prior expectations. Despite considerable convergence
towards a mainstream microfinance approach over time, the very different histories
of the two organisations continue to influence their organisational cultures. 
BRAC adopted microcredit as a key aspect of its activities almost from the outset
and had mainstreamed it by the mid-1980s. It has remained at the core of its
activities although the organisation has diversified into a variety of social services.
As it moved towards the goal of financial sustainability in the 1990s, weekly 
meetings were given over to financial matters (McGregor 1998), edging out the
time for the discussion of social issues – to the disappointment of some of its
longer-standing members (Kabeer and Matin 2005). Impact assessments of
BRAC, both its own and externally conducted ones, have generally reported 
evidence of economic impacts as well as some social ones (McGregor 1998;
Khandker 1998 and 2005; Amin, Becker and Bayes 1998) although contrary 
evidence on economic impacts has also been reported (Morduch 1998; Roodman
and Morduch 2009; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Zaman 1999). However, where it
has been sought, the evidence on impact is weaker on the kind of active political
engagement that makes up our indicators of grassroots democracy in this paper
(Kabeer and Matin 2005; Hashemi et al. 1996).  
15 It is worth noting here that Grameen had lowered its interest rates prior to PKSF stipulation.
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While Proshika provided credit to its members from early on in its evolution, we
pointed out that it had sought to promote a borrower-led management of loans that
was consonant with its social mobilisation agenda. By the 1990s, it was coming
under pressure from its donors to give greater priority to financial sustainability.
Microfinance came to occupy an increasingly dominant position in its operations.
Since its frontline workers were given greater responsibility for the weekly 
collection and disbursement of loans, the emphasis on grassroots social 
mobilisation was inevitably diluted (Ahmad 2003; Nazneen 2007). However,
traces of its past history are evident in some of the practices reported by Nazneen
(2007). It gives greater voice to its membership than BRAC does because of the
election of group members to federations at village, union and thana level. Its staff
were, till very recently, more likely to be assessed on both social development
and credit criteria. They were also more likely than those of BRAC to mention
women’s economic independence as the reason for targeting credit to women;
BRAC members offered more instrumental reasons relating to women’s superior
track record on loan repayment. These features may explain why Proshika 
members are more actively engaged in community and political life than those of
BRAC. It should be noted that the survey was carried out at a time when Proshika
had fallen out of favour with the party in power in government. Some of Proshika’s
impacts may have been weakened by the political harassment it was suffering
during this period. Although a more supportive party is now in power, Proshika
has been further weakened by internal conflicts.
8 Conclusion: NGOs, development 
and democracy
There are a number of key points relating to the broader questions of development
and democracy that we can draw out of our analysis. First and foremost, it is 
evident that development NGOs expand the sphere of chosen rather than given
relationships in the lives of sizeable numbers of poor women and men in
Bangladesh. This is of particular significance for women who are far more likely
than men to be confined to the ascribed communities of family and kin. Regardless
of the achievements of specific NGOs, their pervasive presence has had important
externalities by helping to undermine some of the long-established hierarchies –
even if some NGOs may be replacing them in some cases with new and 
modernised forms of hierarchy. It may indeed be the case that they are a major
driving force behind the country’s remarkable progress on some key MDGs, as we
noted earlier. 
Secondly, it is also clear from our study that what NGOs do and, more importantly,
how they do it, has a strong bearing on their impacts. In other words, the view of
Putnam and others that what matters for ‘good governance’ is the density of 
associational life rather than the nature of the associations is not supported by our
findings. There is not only a clear difference between the achievements reported
by social mobilisation organisations, at one end of our spectrum, and minimalist
microfinance organisations at the other, there are also important differences within
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the three different categories of organisations that the study covered. As realist
evaluation theory has pointed out,16 development interventions represent the
introduction of complex systems in a complex and changing social reality (Pawson
and Tilly 1997). We have sought to minimise some aspects of this complexity by
confining our study to a limited geographical area but we do not have sufficient
detail on the different organisations to establish with any certainty which particular
aspects of their contexts and programmes may be accounting for the differences
in their impact. 
Taken together, however, our findings suggest that minimalist microfinance 
organisations have had minimalist impacts on the lives of their intended 
beneficiaries – poor women and their families in rural Bangladesh. If poor women
and men in Bangladesh are to overcome the economic, political and social barriers
to their progress, it is evident from this finding that they need support on a variety
of fronts. Financial services are important if poor people are to cope with crisis and
respond to opportunities but, on their own, do not equip them with the capacity to
translate these services into lasting economic progress or to engage with ‘bad
governance’ at the local level. Equally, perhaps, an over-emphasis on social
mobilisation without due attention to livelihood issues may promote grassroots
participation but will not overcome the barriers to economic advancement. 
As some of the quotes cited in this study suggest, poor people need both
improved access to material resources as well as the strengthening of their political
capabilities. Despite the hostility of social mobilisation organisations to NGOs as
credit providers and the dismissal by staunch advocates of microfinance of the
value of ‘struggle’, the two need not be mutually exclusive. One possible way out
would appear to be the ‘microfinance plus’ approach of the kind represented by
BRAC and Proshika. However, there are reasons to be cautious about this. Once
organisations begin to prioritise microfinance, and particularly when they begin to
prioritise the financial sustainability of their microfinance services, the slow and
painstaking process of building political capabilities tends to take second place. 
It is extremely telling, for instance, that both BRAC and Proshika assign their 
better-qualified staff to their microfinance programmes and their less well-qualified
staff to their social development activities (Nazneen 2007)! It is also telling that
frontline workers in both BRAC and, increasingly, Proshika ranked achievement of
loan collection and savings targets as the key criteria on which their performance
is assessed by their organisations. Other studies have noted how the weekly
meetings of microfinance organisations are dominated by financial matters, leaving
little time for the kinds of discussions that build people’s awareness, analytical
capacity and sense of citizenship (Ahmad 2003; Thornton et al. 2000).
An alternative option is suggested by our NK findings. This would be to promote
organisations with different kinds of core competencies and allow the possibility of
16 Pawson and Tilley argue for a ‘realist’ approach to impact evaluation in place of purely quantitative 
experimental and quasi-experimental methods, including randomised control trials, that have been 
transferred from medical sciences into the social sciences. They argue that it is inappropriate to apply 
methods developed in the laboratory to the messy reality of everyday life.
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belonging to these different kinds of organisations. Despite NK’s rhetoric of hostility
towards NGO provision of microfinance, we found that many of its members
belong to microfinance organisations. Rutherford reports that he found little 
evidence of active campaigning against microcredit by frontline fieldworkers.
Instead they offered a more pragmatic explanation for their refusal to offer loans:
that microfinance did not mix well with NK’s core activity of organising poor people:
‘one tends to push out the other’ (p. 180). While it is difficult for organisations like
NK and Samata to achieve the scale of ASA, Grameen or BRAC, given the 
intensive investments they make in the human capabilities of both their staff and
their group members, there is in principle no reason why there could not be a 
multiplicity of such organisations. 
The only problem with the latter scenario is that social mobilisation organisations
have all but disappeared from Bangladesh. The massive increase in donor funding
for development NGOs in the 1990s not only encouraged the move towards a
service delivery model but also saw the collapse of a number of organisations 
oriented toward social mobilisation.17 It was evident that the accountancy systems
of these organisations were least equipped to cope with this dramatic injection in
funds (Stiles 2002; Kabeer and Huq 2010). It is not clear whether Proshika will
recover from its current crisis, and Samata has had its funds withdrawn while NK
is struggling to survive. Official donors continue to favour the larger NGOs, 
particularly those that are likely to become self-financing in the near future, while
the international NGOs that used to be a source of solidarity funding for social
mobilisation organisations have become themselves increasingly dependent on
donor funding and vehicles of donor agendas (Desai and Imrie 1998; Wallace
2004). 
Regardless of how donor civil society relationships play out in the future, there is
one important finding that comes out of our study that is worth emphasising.
Despite the references to the deep roots of inequality in the psychology of
Bangladeshi society cited earlier – its ‘naturalisation’ – our study shows that poor
people do not accept their subordinate status as natural, acceptable or immutable.
If the microfinance-plus organisations have been able to mobilise the 
entrepreneurial capacity of the poor, the socially oriented organisations have
drawn attention to the critical importance of building human capabilities in its
broadest sense if democracy is to take root and flourish in Bangladesh. Along with
analytical skills, dignity and sense of worth, these capabilities include knowledge
of rights, awareness of social injustice and the collective willingness to challenge it
on behalf of self and others. In building these capabilities, social mobilisation
organisations have helped to transform their members from the clients of the rich
and powerful into citizens willing to engage with the structures of power and to
stand up for the rights of the poor. If the abysmal quality of governance in
Bangladesh is to ever improve, it will be through the construction of these kinds of
citizenship, these ‘habits of the heart’, on a national scale.
17 Examples include Gono Shahajyo Sangstha and Saptagram.
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Appendix 1
Table A1-1.1 Multinomial logit coefficients of NGO membership
Samata Nijera Kori BRAC Proshika Grameen
Bank
Personal 
characteristics
Age -0.132500 -0.2826*** -0.023200v -0.0372 0.0447 
(0.0806)0 (0.0828)00 (0.0557)00 (0.0577) (0.0612)
Age2 0.0018*0 0.0033*** 0.000700 0.0009 -0.00020
(0.0009)0 (0.001)000 (0.0007)00 (0.0007) (0.0008)
Some primary 0.25660 0.645000 1.7241*** 0.5078 001.4453***
education (0.5739)0 (0.5892)00 (0.3535)00 (0.3959) (0.3844)
Primary +education 0.0744 0 -0.394500 1.6405*** 0.4393 01.3538**
(0.9004)0 (0.9137)00 (0.6005)00 (0.6514) (0.6158)
2nd NGO -2.2027*** -0.7658**0 0.240300 -0.9287*** -0.26510
(0.3718)0 (0.3421)00 (0.1896)00 (0.2051) (0.2048)
Household 
characteristics
Non-Muslim -4.784***0 0.1393 00 0.3694*0 -1.4631*** -0.5255**0
(0.7955)0 (0.3759)00 (0.2094)00 (0.2765) 0 (0.24)0000
Average adult -0.023600 0.054600 -0.0878000 0.049700 0.053200
schooling (years) (0.1131)0 (0.1121)00 (0.0822)00 (0.0884) 0 (0.0821)00
Main reasons for 
joining an NGO
Credit -9.1992*** -11.1041***00 -0.1674000 -2.3866**0 -2.8843**0
(1.1742)0 (1.4886)00 (1.4403)00 (1.2013)0 (1.1478)00
Savings -2.8757**0 -2.8373**0 -0.5478000 -0.650600 -3.1606**0
(1.1716)0 (1.1636)00 (1.5325)00 (1.2514)0 (1.25)000v
Support -2.6905**0 -1.6764 00 -0.4585 00 -1.522000 -3.6606**0
(1.1999)0 (1.1698)00 (1.6736)00 (1.3575)0 (1.5711)00
Village characteristics
Road 0.8729** 3.8608*** 0.3395*0 0.31450 1.6991***
(0.3482)0 (0.6098)00 (0.1925)00 (0.1998)0 (0.2361)00
Electricity 1.6885** -1.126900 1.2845*** 20.8159***   20.1953***
(0.7282)0 (0.7964) 0 (0.256)000 (1.7029)0 (1.7124)00
Constant 6.9372*** 8.8558*** -2.0535 00 -18.0786000 -20.274700
(2.1337)0 (2.1027)0 (1.8661)00 undefined     undefined
Observations 286 230 266 270 257
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Base category: ASA
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Appendix 2
Econometric estimation of impacts 
Table A2-1.1 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Food
shortage in the last year
Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0-0.025** 0.007 00.032* -0.0030 000.082*** 0.015
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025)
Age2 0 0.000** -0.0000 -0.000* -0.0000 00-0.001*** -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.009 -0.0410 0.142 00.248* 0.107 0 0.334**
education (0.111) (0.127) (0.140) (0.137) (0.108) (0.162)
Complete primary -0.0140 -0.0440 0.253 00.412* 0.015 00.519*
education (0.170) (0.216) (0.222) (0.215) (0.149) (0.272)
Female -0.0650 -0.0280 0.051 dropped dropped dropped
(0.054) (0.086) (0.082) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.141 0.074 -0.0560 0.041 -0.129*
[1] (0.087) (0.111) (0.064) (0.067) (0.072)
Ave. household -0.0300 -0.0380 0-0.068** 00-0.122*** -0.0210 00-0.131***
schooling (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) (0.046)
2nd NGO 0.078 -0.0340 0-0.154** 0.010 0.027 0.011
(0.110) (0.084) (0.069) (0.058) (0.053) (0.064)
Pucca/brick road -0.116* -0.0640 000.212*** -0.0020 -0.154* 0.013
(0.063) (0.226) (0.069) (0.070) (0.088) (0.060)
Electricity -0.0760 -0.0790 dropped 0.096 dropped -0.0790
(0.196) (0.207) [2] (0.084) [2] (0.070)
Years of -0.0060 0 -0.026*** 0.001 -0.0010 -0.0050 -0.0110
membership (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observed probability 0.239 0.413 0.367 0.308 0.233 0.353
Observations 284 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts failure perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.030* -0.0120 -0.0090 -0.0100 -0.0140 0.040*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024)
Age2 0 -0.00000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.153 -0.1100 0.052 -0.0420 0.129 0.051
education (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.114) (0.092) (0.125)
Complete primary 0.266 -0.1520 -0.0180 0.095 -0.0080 0.058
education (0.163) (0.190) (0.201) (0.182) (0.165) (0.238)
Female 0.135** 0.080 -0.0920 dropped dropped dropped
(0.065) (0.080) (0.078) [3] [3] [3]
Non-Muslim dropped -0.0220 0.073 0.021 -0.1010 0.181**
[1] (0.084) (0.100) (0.069) (0.076) (0.077)
Ave. household 0.012 0.049** 0.044 0.034 0.024 0.035
schooling (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.034)
2nd NGO -0.278** -0.0850 0.049 0.077 0.041 0.048
(0.115) (0.078) (0.073) (0.062) (0.060) (0.067)
Pucca/brick road 0.169** 0.186 0.130* -0.0420 0.149 0.094
(0.072) (0.171) (0.069) (0.074) (0.093) (0.062)
Electricity dropped -0.0830 dropped 0.115 dropped -0.0040
[2] (0.200) [3] (0.111) [3] (0.072)
Years of 0.001 0.011** -0.0050 0.004 0.016* 0.002
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.568 0.387 0.644 0.647 0.693 0.569
Observations 278 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly; [2] predicts failure perfectly; [3] dropped because of 
colinearity
Table A2-1.2 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Whether
household ate 4 out of 6 pre-specified items of food
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.0060 0.012** 0.036*** 0.010** 0.029*** 0.012
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary dropped 0.041* -0.0740 -0.0510 0.023 0.042
education [1] (0.024) (0.105) (0.064) (0.056) (0.038)
Complete primary 0.027 0.063 -0.0090 -0.1900 0.157 0.011
education (0.026) (0.060) (0.127) (0.150) (0.111) (0.089)
Female 0.007 -0.162*** dropped dropped dropped dropped
(0.011) (0.043) [1] [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.024 -0.198* -0.0140 -0.0230 -0.096*
[1] (0.028) (0.117) (0.026) (0.048) (0.056)
Ave. household -0.0030 -0.0080 0.005 0.014* -0.0160 -0.0060
schooling (0.003) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
2nd NGO -0.0550 0.034 -0.0150 0.053** -0.0170 0.062**
(0.079) (0.023) (0.046) (0.026) (0.037) (0.029)
Pucca/brick road 0.002 -0.0090 -0.086** -0.048* 0.022 -0.0430
(0.010) (0.052) (0.044) (0.025) (0.056) (0.033)
Electricity dropped 0.071 dropped 0.039 dropped -0.0040
[1] (0.126) [2] (0.052) [2] (0.033)
Years of -0.0000 0.004* 0.008** 0.008** 0.000 0.004
membership (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Observed probability 0.967 0.874 0.881 0.936 0.899 0.915
Observations 242 230 210 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-1.3 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Whether
member had access to paid work in past year
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.036** 0.022 0.007 0.056*** 0.020 0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.024)
Age2 -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.013 -0.1380 0.061 0.011 0.127 -0.0610
education (0.121) (0.131) (0.122) (0.116) (0.119) (0.118)
Complete primary 0.132 -0.3240 0.140 -0.1710 0.148 -0.0550
education (0.178) (0.202) (0.190) (0.185) (0.168) (0.218)
Female -0.113* -0.1040 -0.144* dropped dropped dropped
(0.064) (0.092) (0.086) [1] [1] [1]
Non-Muslim 0.096 0.214** -0.1170 0.144** 0.145* -0.168**
(0.318) (0.091) (0.104) (0.072) (0.080) (0.074)
Ave. household 0.015 0.072*** 0.010 0.065** 0.022 0.055*
schooling (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.021) (0.030)
2nd NGO -0.1010 -0.0670 -0.0340 -0.0700 -0.0350 -0.0330
(0.126) (0.090) (0.079) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
Pucca/brick road -0.0040 -0.1070 -0.0000 0.038 -0.0400 -0.0430
(0.071) (0.229) (0.074) (0.079) (0.096) (0.062)
Electricity 0.393** 0.036 dropped -0.0770 dropped -0.0720
(0.192) (0.213) [1] (0.111) [1] (0.071)
Years of 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.023*** -0.0070 -0.024** 0.009
membership (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.591 0.487 0.496 0.466 0.381 0.403
Observations 286 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-1.4 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Whether
household owned at least half an acre of land
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.027*0 0.025 0.012 0.024 0.020 0.047*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Age2 -0.000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.184* -0.1390 0.085 0.017 0.051 0.139
education (0.108) (0.117) (0.116) (0.120) (0.117) (0.119)
Complete primary -0.2130 -0.0400 0.175 -0.1980 0.125 0.408**
education (0.166) (0.206) (0.181) (0.185) (0.171) (0.166)
Female 0.019 -0.0040 0.205*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.064) (0.084) (0.079) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.271*** -0.223** 0.326*** 0.302*** -0.173**
[1] (0.081) (0.099) (0.068) (0.077) (0.081)
Ave. household 0.041* 0.003 -0.0270 0.055* -0.0160 -0.070**
schooling (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.032)
2nd NGO -0.1380 -0.143* -0.0370 -0.0850 -0.0610 0.082
(0.112) (0.080) (0.077) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066)
Pucca/brick road -0.123* -0.0260 -0.0180 -0.1090 0.105 -0.0240
(0.071) (0.223) (0.072) (0.081) (0.089) (0.063)
Electricity -0.3230 0.072 dropped 0.065 dropped -0.0210
(0.203) (0.196) [2] (0.118) [2] (0.071)
Years of 0.002 -0.0030 0.003 0.027*** -0.0140 0.001
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.444 0.435 0.530 0.455 0.385 0.544
Observations 284 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-1.5 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Whether
household owned any cows
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.068*** 0.036** -0.0040 0.029*** 0.017 0.005
(0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.0340 -0.0040 -0.0310 0.008 -0.0300 0.027
education (0.119) (0.110) (0.059) (0.051) (0.037) (0.049)
Complete primary -0.0090 0.134 -0.0910 -0.0450 -0.0580 0.041
education (0.179) (0.187) (0.082) (0.071) (0.076) (0.107)
Female -0.253*** -0.414*** -0.304*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.059) (0.072) (0.081) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped -0.1260 -0.0110 0.011 -0.047* -0.0100
[1] (0.079) (0.059) (0.033) (0.026) (0.010)
Aver. hh schooling• 0.035 0.021 0.027** 0.014 0.019** 0.000
(0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
2nd NGO -0.0570 0.062 -0.0500 -0.0110 -0.0120 -0.0150
(0.124) (0.081) (0.045) (0.029) (0.026) (0.012)
Pucca/brick road 0.059 -0.915*** -0.121** 0.047 -0.0050 0.003
(0.069) (0.018) (0.051) (0.035) (0.039) (0.010)
Electricity -0.1870 0.453*** dropped -0.0420 dropped 0.006
(0.227) (0.048) [2] (0.070) [2] (0.009)
Years of 0.011** 0.007 0.007** -0.0010 0.004 -0.0000
membership (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Observed probability 0.338 0.322 0.148 0.079 0.082 0.021
Observations 284 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts failure perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-2.1 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Participation in shalish in last 5 years
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.019** 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.025* 0.006
(0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.000) (0.015) (0.008)
Age2 -0.000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.046 0.004 0.066 -0.0000 dropped dropped
education (0.085) (0.077) (0.070) (0.000) [1] [1]
Complete primary 0.110 -0.0340 0.051 -0.0000 dropped -0.0090
education (0.130) (0.112) (0.076) (0.000) [1] (0.022)
Female -0.0400 -0.194*** -0.090* dropped dropped dropped
(0.033) (0.060) (0.054) [2] [2] [1]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.165*** 0.003 0.000 -0.0450 0.004
[1] (0.052) (0.035) (0.000) (0.032) (0.015)
Ave. household 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.000 0.017* 0.003
schooling (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.000) (0.009) (0.006)
2nd NGO -0.0590 0.035 0.034 0.000 0.026 dropped
(0.040) (0.055) (0.035) (0.000) (0.030) [2]
Pucca/brick road 0.108*** -0.964*** -0.0300 -0.0000 -0.1150 -0.0050
(0.031) (0.009) (0.029) (0.001) (0.123) (0.009)
Electricity -0.2130 0.335*** dropped -0.0000 dropped -0.0050
(0.244) (0.046) [2] (0.001) [2] (0.011)
Years of -0.0010 0.001 0.003* -0.0000 -0.0020 -0.0000
membership (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Observed probability 0.123 0.196 0.063 0.026 0.078 0.027
Observations 284 230 270 266 129 146
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts failure perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-2.2 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Participation in at least one village-level committee
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
56
Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.045** 0.027 0.040** 0.043*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.087 0.045 -0.0850 0.015 -0.0190 -0.0910
education (0.122) (0.126) (0.122) (0.115) (0.122) (0.124)
Complete primary 0.287* 0.114 0.010 0.014 -0.2050 -0.1800
education (0.163) (0.202) (0.176) (0.189) (0.176) (0.227)
Female -0.127* -0.0880 -0.166** – – –
(0.066) (0.083) (0.082)
Non-Muslim – 0.071 0.006 -0.0820 0.015 0.039
(0.083) (0.106) (0.072) (0.083) (0.083)
Ave. household 0.005 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.045* 0.057*
schooling (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.033)
2nd NGO 0.137 -0.1180 0.020 0.136** 0.038 -0.174***
(0.113) (0.077) (0.064) (0.079) (0.068) (0.066)
Pucca/brick road 0.020 -0.0600 0.045 0.145* 0.200** 0.096
(0.072) (0.256) (0.073) (0.076) (0.092) (0.063)
Electricity 0.124 0.164 -0.1070 0.160**
(0.223) (0.185) (0.107) (0.070)
Years of 0.002 0.002 0.017*** 0.011 0.044*** -0.0060
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Observed probability
Observations 284 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly; [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-2.3 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Accompany others to government services
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.031*** 0.030** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.025** 0.011
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.022)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.053 -0.1340 -0.0340 0.105 0.038 -0.1320
education (0.059) (0.131) (0.105) (0.094) (0.075) (0.136)
Complete primary 0.050 -0.2710 -0.1330 0.158 0.013 -0.0130
education (0.105) (0.212) (0.180) (0.160) (0.135) (0.238)
Female 0.023 0.074 -0.137*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.042) (0.079) (0.049) [1] [1] [1]
Non-Muslim -0.2630 -0.0250 -0.0000 0.075 -0.0950 -0.0270
(0.350) (0.080) (0.080) (0.064) (0.065) (0.074)
Ave. household 0.009 0.051** 0.034 0.022 0.021 0.047
schooling (0.016) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018) (0.034)
2nd NGO 0.033 0.050 0.023 0.063 -0.0040 0.016
(0.061) (0.076) (0.055) (0.059) (0.048) (0.059)
Pucca/brick road -0.0160 -0.371*** 0.009 0.170** 0.152* -0.0010
(0.044) (0.060) (0.053) (0.070) (0.087) (0.055)
Electricity -0.0230 0.653*** dropped -0.212*** dropped 0.026
(0.114) (0.143) [1] (0.057) [1] (0.064)
Years of 0.008** 0.008 -0.0010 0.006 0.020*** -0.0110
membership (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observed probability 0.846 0.683 0.800 0.699 0.817 0.721
Observations 286 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-2.4 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Approached by others in community for advice
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.00600 0.009 0.026 0.028** 0.009 -0.0010
(0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.002)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.000** -0.0000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.0760 0.059 -0.0540 -0.0280 -0.060* dropped
education (0.131) (0.114) (0.091) (0.053) (0.033) [1]
Complete primary -0.0240 -0.2280 0.049 -0.0530 -0.0190 -0.0110
education (0.188) (0.228) (0.159) (0.088) (0.082) (0.016)
Female -0.0650 -0.217*** 0.044 dropped dropped dropped
(0.063) (0.078) (0.067) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.065 0.058 -0.0030 dropped -0.0010
[1] (0.090) (0.095) (0.036) [1] (0.004)
Ave. household -0.0040 0.023 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003
schooling (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.003)
2nd NGO -0.2010 0.011 -0.0040 0.004 -0.055* 0.003
(0.162) (0.082) (0.066) (0.034) (0.033) (0.006)
Pucca/brick road 0.059 0.902*** 0.090 0.005 -0.0130 0.000
(0.074) (0.028) (0.058) (0.040) (0.045) (0.004)
Electricity dropped -0.464*** dropped 0.059 dropped -0.0360
[1] (0.060) [2] (0.040) [2] (0.028)
Years of 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.012** 0.003 0.006 0.000
membership (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
Observed probability 0.651 0.591 0.248 0.098 0.067 0.020
Observations 278 230 270 266 195 247
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts failure perfectly, [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-2.5 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Participated in campaign/protest/other collective action
IDS WORKING PAPER 343
59
Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.00800 0.027*** 0.001 0.008 0.018 0.004
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.0130 -0.0160 -0.0380 0.144 0.065 dropped
education (0.044) (0.074) (0.037) (0.090) (0.077) [1]
Complete primary -0.077* 0.014 -0.0670 0.119 0.047 0.002
education (0.045) (0.124) (0.059) (0.117) (0.080) (0.009)
Female 0.004 -0.111** -0.0770 dropped dropped dropped
(0.028) (0.057) (0.056) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped -0.0680 -0.067*** -0.0120 -0.0180 0.000
[1] (0.059) (0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.003)
Ave. household 0.024*** 0.022* 0.026*** 0.001 0.002 0.001
schooling (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001)
2nd NGO 0.010 0.013 -0.0030 0.026 0.014 0.002
(0.070) (0.055) (0.038) (0.028) (0.031) (0.005)
Pucca/brick road 0.015 -0.963*** -0.0580 0.040 -0.0850 0.010
(0.030) (0.010) (0.040) (0.034) (0.063) (0.012)
Electricity dropped 0.326*** dropped 0.011 dropped -0.013
[1] (0.049) [2] (0.051) [2] (0.015)
Years of 0.005** 0.009*** 0.006** 0.003 0.001 0.000
membership (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
Observed probability 0.094 0.213 0.100 0.075 0.074 0.032
Observations 278 230 270 266 257 247
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly, [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-3.1 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Interacted with TNO in last year
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.014 0.015 0.035* 0.021 0.044** 0.108***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.000* -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.0490 -0.0120 0.171* -0.1440 0.087 0.116
education (0.118) (0.123) (0.103) (0.113) (0.116) (0.128)
Complete primary -0.1590 -0.2830 0.217 -0.330* 0.007 -0.0230
education (0.179) (0.204) (0.169) (0.171) (0.178) (0.230)
Female -0.232*** -0.324*** -0.411*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.059) (0.071) (0.055) [1] [1] [1]
Non-Muslim 0.018 0.046 0.318*** -0.0660 -0.166** -0.207***
(0.324) (0.083) (0.106) (0.072) (0.079) (0.074)
Ave. household 0.013 0.029 -0.0300 0.030 0.015 0.037
schooling (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.031)
2nd NGO 0.039 0.091 0.007 0.122* 0.032 0.060
(0.108) (0.075) (0.075) (0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
Pucca/brick road 0.056 -0.1560 0.046 0.021 -0.0660 0.101
(0.068) (0.163) (0.072) (0.076) (0.095) (0.064)
Electricity -0.1800 -0.0200 dropped 0.091 dropped -0.123*
(0.160) (0.186) [1] (0.109) [1] (0.073)
Years of 0.011** 0.005 -0.0100 -0.0030 0.006 -0.0020
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.647 0.661 0.596 0.560 0.510 0.410
Observations 286 230 270 266 257 283
Table A2-3.2 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Interacted with UP members in past year
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.025** 0.024 0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.005)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.084 -0.0020 0.168 0.050 -0.0470 0.033
education (0.120) (0.118) (0.114) (0.067) (0.070) (0.056)
Complete primary -0.0220 -0.1390 0.057 -0.1130 -0.360*** 0.031
education (0.192) (0.178) (0.144) (0.071) (0.134) (0.092)
Female -0.225*** -0.167** -0.1000 dropped dropped dropped
(0.064) (0.077) (0.072) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.022 dropped -0.0030 -0.0630 0.001
[1] (0.081) [1] (0.033) (0.050) (0.016)
Ave. household 0.020 0.039* 0.012 0.030** 0.056*** -0.0000
schooling (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006)
2nd NGO -0.235* -0.0470 -0.108** 0.055* 0.019 0.008
(0.138) (0.075) (0.048) (0.031) (0.046) (0.014)
Pucca/brick road 0.050 -0.869*** -0.0290 -0.0080 -0.0540 -0.0100
(0.074) (0.019) (0.057) (0.037) (0.073) (0.012)
Electricity -0.0310 0.638*** dropped -0.1120 dropped 0.005
(0.212) (0.036) [2] (0.086) [2] (0.013)
Years of 0.024*** 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.0030 0.001
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002)
Observed probability 0.588 0.383 0.169 0.102 0.171 0.028
Observations 284 230 242 266 257 283
Table A2-3.3 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Consulted by UP Chairman on community matters
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.060*** 0.037** 0.019 0.005 0.023 -0.0010
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.197 0.193 0.170 -0.0580 -0.0360 0.004
education (0.134) (0.132) (0.120) (0.059) (0.080) (0.039)
Complete primary 0.465*** 0.012 0.222 -0.1180 -0.2150 0.014
education (0.169) (0.197) (0.181) (0.095) (0.134) (0.072)
Female -0.340*** -0.204*** 0.384*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.061) (0.078) (0.080) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped -0.193** -0.151* -0.0580 -0.152*** -0.031*
[1] (0.086) (0.083) (0.041) (0.047) (0.018)
Ave. household -0.0300 0.014 -0.0030 0.020 0.025 0.009
schooling (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008)
2nd NGO 0.012 -0.0420 0.031 0.026 -0.0000 -0.0300
(0.126) (0.079) (0.076) (0.042) (0.050) (0.020)
Pucca/brick road 0.040 -0.2240 -0.0650 0.061 0.076 -0.0220
(0.073) (0.277) (0.071) (0.050) (0.057) (0.019)
Electricity -0.3460 0.128 dropped -0.0400 dropped 0.007
(0.218) (0.191) [2] (0.090) [2] (0.019)
Years of 0.003 0.014*** -0.0010 0.010* 0.001 0.004
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
Observed probability 0.415 0.335 0.333 0.135 0.195 0.053
Observations 284 230 270 266 257 283
Table A2-3.4 Marginal/impact effects from probit models:
Campaigned in last UP elections
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.014 -0.0130 0.006 0.007 0.016 0.000
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Age2 -0.0000 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.1250 -0.0120 -0.0860 -0.1580 -0.1300 -0.0980
education (0.116) (0.124) (0.117) (0.115) (0.115) (0.120)
Complete primary -0.0810 -0.0470 -0.2020 -0.2860 -0.1480 -0.1300
education (0.157) (0.208) (0.182) (0.183) (0.171) (0.219)
Female 0.075 -0.1270 0.085 dropped dropped dropped
(0.046) (0.079) (0.083) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim -0.3190 0.103 0.095 0.074 0.023 -0.0690
(0.364) (0.085) (0.101) (0.072) (0.079) (0.081)
Ave. household 0.013 0.024 0.034 0.048* 0.025 0.031
schooling (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030)
2nd NGO -0.352*** -0.0260 -0.0420 0.162** 0.074 0.018
(0.127) (0.080) (0.076) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)
Pucca/brick road 0.009 0.091 -0.0390 0.098 -0.0100 -0.0450
(0.050) (0.221) (0.072) (0.076) (0.093) (0.062)
Electricity dropped 0.044 dropped -0.0950 dropped 0.020
[1] (0.199) [2] (0.103) [2] (0.070)
Years of 0.012*** 0.013** 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.013
membership (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.821 0.622 0.541 0.541 0.553 0.488
Observations 280 230 270 266 257 283
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
[1] predicts success perfectly, [2] dropped because of colinearity
Table A2-4.1 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Believes
there has been an improvement in the quality of justice
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age -0.027* 0.031*** 0.011 -0.035** 0.029** 0.018
(0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020)
Age2 0.000 -0.000** -0.0000 0.000** -0.000** -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary 0.142 0.166** 0.027 -0.0510 0.155** 0.012
education (0.110) (0.067) (0.089) (0.088) (0.071) (0.104)
Complete primary -0.1110 0.187 0.051 -0.0400 0.061 0.061
education (0.182) (0.151) (0.139) (0.142) (0.150) (0.178)
Female -0.0310 -0.137** 0.161*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.063) (0.068) (0.051) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim 0.036 0.233*** dropped 0.228*** 0.235*** 0.142**
(0.345) (0.066) [1] (0.042) (0.046) (0.060)
Ave. household 0.003 -0.0110 -0.0150 0.008 0.009 -0.0130
schooling (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026)
2nd NGO -0.0240 0.065 0.000 -0.0500 0.102* -0.0610
(0.121) (0.064) (0.062) (0.044) (0.054) (0.058)
Pucca/brick road 0.110 dropped -0.0430 0.032 -0.160*** 0.047
(0.071) [1] (0.058) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
Electricity -0.1090 dropped dropped 0.007 dropped 0.147**
(0.196) [1] [2] (0.070) [2] (0.066)
Years of 0.011** -0.0070 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.010
membership (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Observed probability 0.584 0.772 0.806 0.801 0.755 0.753
Observations 286 197 242 266 257 283
Table A2-4.2 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Trust in
people from other religions
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.000 0.022*** 0.012 0.015* 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.021)
Age2 0.000 0.000*** -0.0000 -0.000** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary dropped 0.109* -0.2010 -0.0380 0.006 -0.1710
education [1] (0.066) (0.173) (0.076) (0.024) (0.198)
Complete primary dropped dropped -0.1600 -0.1530 0.042 -0.602*
[1] [1] (0.249) (0.160) (0.068) (0.343)
Female dropped -0.064* 0.123*** dropped dropped dropped
[1] (0.036) (0.036) [2] [2] [2]
Non-Muslim dropped 0.042 -0.0020 0.018 -0.0040 0.128**
[1] (0.045) (0.058) (0.038) (0.020) (0.057)
Ave. household dropped -0.0380 0.057** 0.031* 0.001 0.128**
schooling [1] (0.036) (0.025) (0.017) (0.007) (0.050)
2nd NGO 0.000 -0.0070 0.038 0.015 0.007 -0.0430
(0.000) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.016) (0.055)
Pucca/brick road 0.000 0.987*** -0.0170 0.024 0.040 -0.0610
(0.000) (0.006) (0.036) (0.043) (0.040) (0.052)
Electricity dropped -0.220*** dropped 0.022 dropped 0.113*
[2] (0.052) [2] (0.055) [2] (0.062)
Years of dropped 0.001 0.009** 0.010* 0.005* 0.000
membership [2] (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007)
Observed probability 0.917 0.878 0.826 0.898 0.957 0.731
Observations 24 148 270 266 257 283
Table A2-4.3 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: Thinks
of self as citizen
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Variables Samata Nijera Proshika BRAC Grameen ASA
Kori Bank
Age 0.014 0.008 0.017 0.022 0.006 -0.0010
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024)
Age2 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.000* -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some primary -0.0090 0.114 0.126 -0.1560 -0.0230 0.045
education (0.078) (0.080) (0.091) (0.121) (0.091) (0.126)
Complete primary -0.0080 0.331** 0.259* -0.398** 0.093 0.139
education (0.117) (0.130) (0.142) (0.195) (0.135) (0.227)
Female -0.0650 -0.142** 0.178*** dropped dropped dropped
(0.041) (0.065) (0.066) [1] [1] [1]
Non-Muslim -0.2990 0.203*** 0.051 0.094 0.041 0.140*
(0.357) (0.074) (0.091) (0.059) (0.056) (0.079)
Ave. household 0.004 -0.0310 -0.0100 0.082*** -0.0140 0.012
schooling (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.017) (0.033)
2nd NGO 0.002 0.003 -0.0360 -0.0430 0.058 -0.0610
(0.069) (0.067) (0.071) (0.055) (0.049) (0.067)
Pucca/brick road 0.029 0.157 0.078 -0.0150 0.011 -0.137**
(0.045) (0.211) (0.066) (0.065) (0.072) (0.063)
Electricity 0.042 0.110 dropped -0.0810 dropped 0.110
(0.158) (0.188) [1] (0.077) [1] (0.071)
Years of 0.004 0.005 -0.0010 0.015* 0.005 -0.0010
membership (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Observed probability 0.874 0.757 0.689 0.744 0.817 0.541
Observations 286 230 270 266 257 283
Table A2-4.4 Marginal/impact effects from probit models: All
members of community are equal citizens
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